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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) evolution is gradually reshaping the physical world
into smart environments that involve a large number of interconnected resource-
constrained devices which collect, process, and exchange enormous amount of (more
or less) sensitive information. With the increasing number of interconnected IoT
devices and their capabilities to control the environment, IoT systems are becoming
a prominent target of sophisticated cyberattacks. To deal with the expanding attack
surface, IoT systems require adequate security mechanisms to verify the reliability
of IoT devices.
Remote attestation protocols have recently gained wide attention in IoT systems
as valuable security mechanisms that detect the adversarial presence and guarantee
the legitimate state of IoT devices. Various attestation schemes have been proposed
to optimize the effectiveness and efficiency of remote attestation protocols of a single
IoT device or a group of IoT devices. Nevertheless, some cyber attacks remain
undetected by current attestation methods, and attestation protocols still introduce
non-negligible computational overheads for resource-constrained devices.
This thesis presents the following new contributions in the area of remote attes-
tation protocols that verify the trustworthiness of IoT devices.
First, this thesis shows the limitations of existing attestation protocols against
runtime attacks which, by compromising a device, may maliciously influence the
operation of other genuine devices that interact with the compromised one. To detect
such an attack, this thesis introduces the service perspective in remote attestation
and presents a synchronous remote attestation protocol for distributed IoT services.
Second, this thesis designs, implements and evaluates a novel remote attestation
scheme that releases the constraint of synchronous interaction between devices and
enables the attestation of asynchronous distributed IoT services. The proposed
scheme also attests asynchronously a group of IoT devices, without interrupting the
regular operations of all the devices at the same time.
Third, this thesis proposes a new approach that aims to reduce the interruption
time of the regular work that remote attestation introduces in an IoT device. This
approach intends to decrease the computational overhead of attestation by allowing
an IoT device to securely offload the attestation process to a cloud service, which
then performs attestation independently on the cloud, on behalf of the IoT device.
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Introduction
Interactions between a large set of heterogeneous smart devices are continuously
providing a representation of the physical world into a massively interconnected
network, empowering the paradigm of the so-called Internet of Things (IoT). The
ability of these smart devices to connect and interact among themselves enables IoT
systems to ultimately support the deployment of large-scale IoT applications. The
recent IoT evolution is leading towards multi-functional IoT devices that provide
a set of services; for instance, the development kits such as ST [24], Arduino [7],
SensorTile [23] have simplified the development of multi-sensor solutions. With
IoT services increasingly provided by IoT devices, service interaction in IoT is the
fundamental facilitator of delivering wide range IoT applications in various domains
such as healthcare, smart city, industrial control. Likewise, in the military domain,
cyberdefense autonomous agents need to collaborate and negotiate among themselves
to accomplish their mission-critical goals and confront adversarial actions [78]. Service
interaction is also supported by Software Defined Networking (SDN), that uses service
function chaining (SFC) to connect in a virtual chain different network services, such
as firewalls, network address translation, and intrusion protection.
Due to a large number of interacting IoT services, the importance of the operations
2 1. Introduction
that these services perform, and the lack of sophisticated security protection, the
IoT systems are becoming prone to many cyberattacks. Many adversaries aim to
exploit these services to access sensitive information of the IoT devices, disrupt
their normal operation, and even corrupt the data and software to violate the
legitimate operations of the devices [58,87,89,103]. Indeed, the inter-connectivity
and the internet-wide deployment of IoT devices amplifies the attack’s impact. For
instance, Mirai botnet [77] exploited vulnerabilities on thousands IoT devices, and
instrumented the compromised devices to launch a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack against Dyn, the primary DNS provider in the U.S. As a result,
major US websites including Paypal, Twitter and Amazon faced connectivity issues
while Dyn lost approximately 8% of its customers [105]. More recently, researchers
have shown how cyber criminals could infiltrate any home or corporate network by
exploiting a vulnerability in the fax protocol used in tens of millions of fax machines
globally. The exploitation of a printer-fax device could allow the cyberattacker to
gain complete control over the printer and possibly infiltrate the rest of the network
connected to it [69].
To improve the security, Remote attestation serves as a promising malware
detection technique that reports the adversarial presence and provides evidence
about the integrity of individual devices. In general, a remote attestation protocol
runs between two parties: a trusted party called Verifier and an untrusted party
called Prover. During the attestation, the Prover sends evidence about its current
memory content to the Verifier, whereas the Verifier checks the information, and
establishes whether the Prover is trustworthy. Existing remote attestation protocols
consider different parts of the device’s memory during the verification process, and
they may perform attestation over one single device or a group of devices.
This thesis enhances existing state-of-the-art remote attestation on IoT devices
by introducing the service perspectives in remote attestation protocols. In particular,
this thesis presents novel remote attestation mechanisms to check the integrity of
interacting IoT services that communicate synchronously or asynchronously among
themselves. In addition, this thesis proposes a novel approach of providing the remote
attestation as a service for IoT devices to offload IoT attestation to a cloud service.
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1.1 Motivation and Challenges
With billions of devices, services and systems getting connected, IoT devices are
becoming more pervasive and are emerging as an integral part of our everyday life.
Overall, IoT has been considered as a key enabler of digital transformation in various
domains such as healthcare, transportation, industrial systems and many others.
Artificial Intelligence breakthroughs and advances in real-time communications are
also contributing in an exponential growth of IoT. The global IoT market exceeded
100 billion dollars in market revenue for the first time in 2017, and it is expected to
reach to around 1.6 trillion by 2025 [100] as shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1. Size of the Internet of Things (IoT) market worldwide from 2017 to 2025 (in
billion U.S. dollars) according to [100].
The enormous expansion of IoT devices and their limited capabilities to adopt
advanced security techniques are increasingly exposing IoT systems to a broad
range of exploitations [58, 77, 84, 89]. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
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(ISTR) [102] lists the most common IoT threats in 2018 (as shown in Figure 1.2),
among which Mirai botnet was the third most common IoT threat in 2018, with 16
percent of the attacks. Considering the type of IoT devices, IoT attacks involving
connected cameras were increased from 3.5% in 2017 to 15% of attacks in 2018.
Figure 1.3 shows the top IoT device types that have been mostly exploited in 2018.
Routers and wired cameras were the most compromised devices, accounting for 75%
and 15% of the attacks respectively.
THREAT NAME PERCENT
Linux.Lightaidra 31.3
Linux.Kaiten 31.0
Linux.Mirai 15.9
Trojan.Gen.2 8.5
Downloader.Trojan 3.2
Trojan.Gen.NPE 2.8
Linux.Mirai!g1 1.9
Linux.Gafgyt 1.7
Linux.Amnesiark 1.1
Trojan.Gen.NPE.2 0.8
Figure 1.2. Top IoT threats in 2018 according to [102]
To guarantee secure operation of IoT devices, Remote attestation serves as a
promising security technique that detects the malware presence in an IoT device
by allowing a remote trusted party (i.e., Verifier) to check the trustworthiness of a
potentially untrusted device (i.e., Prover). In a typical remote attestation protocol,
the Verifier initiates the attestation by sending a challenge to the Prover. Upon the
attestation request, the Prover stops the regular operation to perform the attestation
immediately. In IoT systems, the existing remote attestation protocols propose
various approaches to detect software and/or physical tampering attacks. Recent
works in the literature suggest a variety of solutions to aggregate the integrity report
of each individual device in a scalable manner across a large number of devices.
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Despite the advancements of the state-of-the-art remote attestation schemes, the
existing remote attestation schemes have some limitations in the context of commu-
nication data exchanged among IoT devices. In an IoT system, where IoT devices
interact autonomously among themselves, the data produced from a compromised
device may lead a legitimate IoT device to exhibit a malicious behaviour when it
interacts with the compromised device. The existing remote attestation schemes
that attest a group of IoT devices, typically detect only the compromised devices,
skipping the detection of devices that perform a malicious behaviour but run a
genuine software.
DEVICE TYPE PERCENT
Router 75.2
Connected Camera 15.2
Multi Media Device 5.4
Firewall 2.1
PBX Phone System 0.6
NAS (Network Attached Storage) 0.6
VoIP phone 0.2
Printer 0.2
Alarm System 0.2
VoIP Adapter 0.1
Figure 1.3. Top device types performing IoT attacks in 2018 according to [102]
In addition, the complexity of the attestation protocol may result in a long
suspension of the usual work of devices while performing attestation. Thus, from
the device’s perspective, remote attestation is an overhead operation that consumes
computational power and battery life. These drawbacks can cause intolerable dis-
ruptions, especially in time-critical infrastructures, e.g., medical facilities, nuclear
plants.
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1.2 Research Aim and Objectives
In this thesis, we investigate remote attestation solutions to guarantee the legitimate
operation of IoT devices.
We focus on IoT scenarios which involve synchronous or asynchronous interactions
between devices. For this reason, we do not consider solutions that aggregate the
individual attestation results of a group of devices without validating the exchanged
data among devices. Instead, we explore solutions that trace and validate the
interactions among IoT devices, in addition to verifying the individual attestation
result of each device.
Moreover, we aim to address the problem of remote attestation overhead and
interruption time that remote attestation introduces on IoT devices deployed in
time-critical infrastructures. In this context, we explore a novel approach to offload
the remote attestation of the IoT devices to a cloud/fog service.
We summarize the objectives of this thesis in the following research questions.
• Question 1: What is the influence of the interactions among IoT devices on
the effectiveness of the existing remote attestation protocols that aim to detect
the compromised devices in an IoT network?
• Question 2: How can a remote attestation protocol detect malicious devices in
a group of IoT devices that interact between each other and run a distributed
IoT service?
• Question 3: How can a remote attestation protocol check the integrity of a
group of devices in which the service invocation happens asynchronously?
• Question 4: Considering the resource-constrained capabilities of low-end IoT
devices, can we design an attestation protocol that reduces the attestation
overhead and the interruption time of the regular work for such devices?
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1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• Synchronous Remote attestation (Question 1-2).
In this thesis, we show that in a distributed IoT service, a compromised service
can produce a corrupted output that affects the integrity of the other legiti-
mate invoked services that interact with the compromised one. In particular,
a run-time adversary can compromise a service of a distributed service by
corrupting the data pointers, which may influence the behaviour of the legiti-
mate invoked services by deviating the control-flow of their software towards a
valid but non-authorized direction. The naive approach of running a control-
flow attestation protocol for each individual service would not detect such
control-flow deviation because the software of the invoked service is genuine,
and the deviation is caused due to the corrupted input received. To this end,
this thesis considers interacting IoT devices and aims to check the integrity of
distributed IoT services that run on these devices. Considering that services
interact synchronously among themselves, this thesis proposes a synchronous
Remote Attestation protocol for Distributed IoT Services (RADIS) [48] that
detects the control-flow deviation of legitimate services, which is caused by an
adversary that has not directly compromised this service but has compromised
another service that interacts with the former.
The results of this contribution are published in [47, 48]. We present this
contribution in Chapter 3.
• Asynchronous Remote attestation (Question 3).
In large-scale systems, IoT devices adopt the use of asynchronous protocols
which pose particular challenges in tracing interactions and the communication
data in remote attestation schemes of IoT devices. This thesis proposes a
novel protocol for Secure Asynchronous Remote Attestation (SARA) [54] of a
group of devices that communicate asynchronously. SARA aims at providing
each Prover with historical information about its own interactions with other
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IoT services. This allows SARA to detect not only the malicious IoT devices,
but also other devices which are performing a non-intended operation due to
their interactions with the infected device. However, collecting secure historical
evidence is challenging in event-driven asynchronous communication models
because it is difficult to predict the time and the order of the service interactions.
To address such an ordering problem, SARA uses the concept of vector clock
to precisely trace event occurrences. In this way, SARA is able to attest the
integrity of asynchronous distributed IoT services. Moreover, SARA performs
the attestation of a group of IoT devices without interrupting the normal
operation of all the devices at the same time. The design of the remote
attestation protocol based on this paradigm allows a device that completes
the local attestation to resume its normal operation although the attestation
may progress on other devices.
The results of this contribution are published in [54]. We present this contribu-
tion in Chapter 4.
• Remote attestation as a service (Question 4).
To reduce the interruption time of the regular work that remote attestation
protocols introduce in a single IoT device, we propose a novel attestation
approach, Remote Attestation as Service (RAaS) [49], that utilizes the cloud
systems resources. In particular, RAaS enables an IoT device to offload the
attestation to a cloud service, and then the cloud service will be able to perform
independently the attestation on behalf of an IoT device. In this work, we
outline a possible solution for designing RAaS to guarantee a secure copy of
the memory of the device to the cloud and the reduce the communication
overhead between the device and the cloud. By offloading the attestation
to cloud, the remote attestation procedure reduces the computations of the
low-end devices, does not suspend a device for a long time to perform usual
work, and consequently saves their battery lifetime.
The results of this contribution are published in [49, 53]. We present this
contribution in Chapter 5.
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This thesis includes results previously published in:
• Edlira Dushku, Md Masoom Rabbani, Mauro Conti, Luigi V. Mancini, Silvio
Ranise. SARA: Secure Asynchronous Remote Attestation. (In press)
In IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 2020. [54].
• Mauro Conti, Edlira Dushku, Luigi V. Mancini, Md Masoom Rabbani, Silvio
Ranise. Remote Attestation as a Service for IoT. In 6th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Internet of Things: Systems, Management and Security
(IOTSMS 2019). 2019. [49].
• Mauro Conti, Edlira Dushku, Luigi V. Mancini. RADIS: Remote Attesta-
tion of Distributed IoT Services. In 6th IEEE International Conference
on Software Defined Systems (SDS-2019). 2019. [48].
• Alexander Kott, Paul Théron, Luigi V. Mancini, Edlira Dushku, Agostino
Panico, Martin Drašar, Benoît LeBlanc, Paul Losiewicz, Alessandro Guar-
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release 2.0. The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation. 2019. [80].
• Alexander Kott, Paul Théron, Martin Drasar, Edlira Dushku, Benoît LeBlanc,
Paul Losiewicz, Alessandro Guarino, Luigi V. Mancini, Agostino Panico, Mauno
Pihelgas, Krzysztof Rzadca.Autonomous Intelligent Cyber-Defense Agent
(AICA) Reference Architecture, Release 2.0. CCDC Army Research
Laboratory Adelphi United States. 2019. [79].
• Edlira Dushku. POSTER: Towards Remote Attestation as a Service
for IoT. In 6th ACM Celebration of Women in Computing. 2019. [53].
• Mauro Conti, Edlira Dushku, Luigi V. Mancini. Distributed Services At-
testation in IoT. In From Database to Cyber Security. Springer, ISBN 978-
3-030-04834-1, 261-273, 2018. [47].
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1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the necessary background to
understand remote attestation protocols, and it provides an overview of the state-of-
the-art remote attestation protocols for IoT devices. Next, Chapter 3 introduces the
idea of attesting IoT services and presents a synchronous remote attestation protocol
for distributed IoT services (RADIS). To release the constraint of synchronous
interactions, Chapter 4 presents a novel asynchronous remote attestation protocol
(SARA) that attests asynchronous distributed IoT services without interrupting
simultaneously the regular work of a group of IoT devices. Chapter 5 proposes
remote attestation as a service (RAaS) as a beyond-state-of-the-art approach of
attestation that aims to deal with the remote attestation overhead and interruption
time that remote attestation introduces in a single IoT device. Finally, Chapter 6
summarises the contributions and suggests the future work directions that follow
this thesis.
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Review of Remote attestation pro-
tocols in IoT systems
This chapter presents a brief review of the recent literature on remote attestation
protocols for IoT systems, with an emphasis on the remote attestation of a group of
IoT devices. To fully grasp the state-of-the-art remote attestation techniques, first
this chapter provides basic background information. Hence, in Section 2.1, we present
an overview of remote attestation. Then, since the designs of remote attestation
schemes rely on the attack models and device architecture, in Section 2.2 we provide
a short background of memory architecture and common exploitation techniques for
IoT devices. Next, we discuss the state-of-the-art remote attestation techniques in
Section 2.3.
2.1 Overview of Remote attestation
Remote attestation has emerged as a valuable security mechanism that provides
evidence about the trustworthiness of a remote untrusted device. The main goal
of a remote attestation protocol is to guarantee the reliability of the evidence that
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an untrusted Prover provides to a trusted Verifier, such that the Verifier can check
remotely the trustworthiness of the Prover.
In a typical remote attestation paradigm (shown in Figure 2.1), the Verifier
knows the expected legitimate configuration h′ of the Prover. Even though the
Prover it is untrusted, it is generally assumed that the Prover is equipped with a
trusted component which is typically a hardware-protected memory. Additionally,
Prover and Verifier share an attestation key k. At the attestation time, Verifier sends
a challenge or a Nonce N to the Prover (Step 1 ). Upon receiving the challenge,
the trusted component of the Prover measures the state of the untrusted software
(Step 2 ), concatenates the measurement h with the challenge N , signs the result
with key k and returns an authentic response δ to the Verifier (Step 3 ). Since
the Verifier knows the expected legitimate configuration of the Prover h′ and the
challenge N , the Verifier computes δ′ (Step 4 ). When the Verifier gets the response
δ from the Prover, compares it with the computed δ′, and if δ matches with δ′, the
Verifier claims that the Prover is trusted, otherwise the Prover is compromised.
Verifier
Challenge N
Authenticated Response
δ = MACk( N || h )
  
   Prover
Measure 
software state
δ’ == MACk( N || h’ )
Untrusted 
Software
Trusted 
Component
δ’ = δ ? If there is a match, 
confirm the trustworthy state
1
2
3
4
h=HASH(Software)
Figure 2.1. Typical remote attestation paradigm
Remote attestation protocols are generally classified into three main categories;
(1) software-based attestation (e.g., [93, 96, 99]), (2) hardware-based attestation
schemes (e.g., [33, 72, 91]), and (3) hybrid attestation schemes (e.g., [41, 55, 73]).
Each of the aforementioned schemes provides distinct advantages and guarantees
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different security level. Software-based attestation schemes, for instance, are low-
cost solutions due to the lack of requirement for a tamper-proof hardware, but
they provide less security guarantees [34, 45]. On the other side, hardware-based
attestation schemes base their security on the use of a specialized hardware platform
as secure execution environment, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [35], ARM
TrustZone [11], and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [21], which guarantee
that the execution of security-critical parts of the attestation protocol is shielded from
compromised software on the device. However, the requirement for costly specialized
hardware-security modules makes hardware-based schemes usually unsuitable for
low-cost Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The recent remote attestation protocols
for IoT devices have generally adopted the hybrid architecture which is based on
hardware/software co-design. The hybrid architecture relies on the presence of a
minimal read-only hardware-protected memory to guarantee uninterrupted, safe
and secure code execution of the remote attestation protocol [61]. For instance, the
research platforms such as SMART [55], SPM [101], SANCUS [85] and TyTAN [41]
follow the hybrid architecture.
2.2 Background
In this section, we briefly summarize some fundamental concepts on IoT memory
architectures and present the common attack techniques on IoT devices.
2.2.1 Memory architecture of IoT devices
The memory of a device is a collection of hardware elements into which the device
stores information. Read Only Memory (ROM) is a non-volatile type of memory
where the information is programmed or burned into the device. In contrast, Random
Access Memory (RAM) is used to store temporary information, thus, the information
in the RAM is volatile.
The device memory architectures can be classified as Von Neumann and Harvard
architectures. The Von Neumann architecture (see Figure 2.2) consists of a single bus
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shared among ROM which contains program code (i.e., instructions), RAM which
contains data, and the I/O which performs either output or input to the environment.
Several of the most popular sensor node platforms today use microcontrollers that
are based on the Von Neumann architecture, e.g., the Tmote Sky [1], Telos [88], Arm
Cortex-M0 [8]. Since in the IoT devices following the Von Neumann architecture,
both instructions and data are stored in the same memory space, an attacker is able
to inject and execute a new arbitrary malicious code inside the device’s memory,
known as code injection attack.
CPU
ROM and RAM
(Program and
Data Memory)
I/O
BUS
Figure 2.2. Von Neumann Memory Architecture
Different from Von Neumann architecture, the Harvard architecture has two
buses (see Figure 2.3). The first bus is ICode BUS which connects the processor
and the ROM and allows the processor to fetch opcodes. The second bus, called a
System BUS, connects RAM with I/O that perform either output or input to the
environment. The second bus allows the processor to fetch an opcode and to write
data to RAM at the exact same time. Arm Cortex M4 [9] and Arm Cortex M7 [10]
follow Harvard architecture.
Due to the characteristics of Harvard architecture, in which data and code are
physically and logically separated, this architecture does not allow an attacker to
directly inject and execute her own malicious code inside the device’s memory.
However, an attacker can redirect the program execution to existing sequences of
instructions that are present in the program memory, known as code-reuse attack.
2.2 Background 15
CPU
ROM
(Program)
RAM
(Data)
I/O
System
BUS
ICode
BUS
Figure 2.3. Harvard Memory Architecture
2.2.2 Code injection attacks
Code injection is an attack that introduces and executes an arbitrary malicious
code into the address space of a vulnerable application [60]. An adversary typically
performs a code injection attack by sending the malicious code along with the input
data to the target application. When the adversary sends larger input data than
the application expects and the application does not validate the input length, the
malicious input data will overwrite the content of the stack above the local buffer
(see Figure 2.4). By sending input data and the malicious code to overflow the local
buffer, the adversary overwrites the address of Saved Based Pointer with the address
of the malicious code. Next, the application will read the address of the malicious
address and then execute the malicious code of the adversary.
2.2.3 Run-time Attacks
While in code-injection attacks the adversary directly injects malicious code into
the memory space of an application, in run-time attacks the adversary exploits a
memory corruption vulnerability and uses Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
technique [94] to hijack program control-flow execution. ROP allows a runtime
attacker to manipulate the execution order of the legitimate sequences of code
already present on the device. In particular, the adversary can corrupt and insert
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code pointers into the system to modify the flow of command in the running service.
For instance, in general when a service calls another service, the return address for
the caller is stored in the stack. An adversary with access to memory vulnerabilities
can manipulate the saved address and point towards a malicious code. The part of
the code that is targeted this way is called gadgets.
Local buffer
Program memory
Function argument
Saved Based
Pointer
Return address
Stack
Padding
Program memory
Function argument
Stack
Pointer Address of malicious
code
Stack
Adversary
Before attack After attack
Malicious code
Stack
Pointer
Figure 2.4. Code injection attack
2.3 The State of the Art
In analyzing the literature on the remote attestation, we primarily consider the
following attributes of existing protocols: dynamic attestation, collective attestation
and distributed attestation. Overall, remote attestation protocols differ primarily
in the parts of the device’s memory that these protocols attest, the number of
the devices included in the attestation, and the adversarial mitigation capabilities.
Table 2.1 summarizes some of the attestation protocols in IoT that we survey in this
chapter.
Memory. Based on the parts of the device memory that the attestation protocols
attest, the attestation schemes fall in two categories: static and dynamic. Static
attestation protocols verify only the integrity of the program memory that contains
the program binaries. That is the part of the memory that remains static during the
software execution. Dynamic attestation protocols aim at checking the integrity of
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Table 2.1. State-of-the-art Remote attestation protocols in IoT.
Name
Memory Devices Adversaries Additional characteristics
SEDA [36] Static Many Software Static network
SANA [30] Static Many Software Static network
DARPA [66] Static Many Software, Physical Static network
SCAPI [74] Static Many Software, Physical Static network
SAP [86] Static Many Software Static networks
ERASMUS [44] Static Many Software, Mobile Self-attestation
SALAD [75] Static Many Software Dynamic network
PADS [31] Static Many Software Dynamic network
LISA [43] Static Many Software, Physical Static network
SeED [67] Static One Software Self-attestation
C-FLAT [28] Dynamic One Software (Control-flow attacks) -
ATRIUM [107] Dynamic One Software (Data attacks) -
ESDRA [81] Dynamic Many Software Distributed verification
DIAT [29] Dynamic Many Software (Control-Flow) Distributed verification
US-AID [64] Dynamic Many Software, Physical Distributed verification
the data memory, the part of the memory that changes during the software execution.
The prominent need for the deployment of dynamic attestation schemes derives from
the necessity of detecting run-time attacks, which produce malicious behaviour of a
device without injecting and executing a new malicious code, but only by changing
the execution order of the existing legitimate code present on the device’s memory.
Number of devices. Considering the number of the devices involved in the
attestation process, we classify remote attestation protocols in two categories (1)
single-device attestation: at the attestation time, the protocol attests only one device,
and (2) collective attestation: attestation protocols aims to check a group of devices.
Furthermore, based on the assumptions of the network topology of the IoT devices,
collective attestation schemes can attest dynamic or static IoT networks.
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Adversaries. In general, remote attestation schemes aim to detect the following
adversarial presence:
1. Software attacks. The adversary manipulates the software running on a devices
either by performing code-injection attacks or run-time attacks (e.g., control-
flow attack, data-attacks).
2. Physical attacks. A physical adversary is capable of capturing a device to
extract its secret information.
3. Mobile adversary. The adversary may destroy or relocate itself into different
regions of device’s memory or into other devices in the network in order to
evade detection at the attestation time.
While remote attestation schemes are typically initiated from a Verifier, some
remote attestation protocols proposed in literature are self-initiated. Ibrahim et
al. proposed SeED [67] as a self-attestation single-device protocol which relies on
pseudo-random function to trigger attestation at unpredictable times and uses a
Real Time Clock (RTC) to timestamp the attestation result. ERASMUS [44] is a
collective attestation which aims to detect malware presence on unattended resource-
constrained devices by performing self-measurement and registration of attestation
results according to a pre-scheduled time. By verifying and comparing the historical
attestation results, the Verifier will be able to identify the presence of a mobile
adversary which, during the attestation, may relocate itself into different regions of
device’s memory or into other devices of the network.
2.3.1 Dynamic attestation
Dynamic attestation approaches aim to verify the run-time state of the Prover
during the usual software execution. Abera et al. [28] propose C-FLAT, a complete
attestation of the run-time state of the Prover. During the execution, each software
instruction is reported into a so-called “trusted anchor” and from there, a hash engine
mechanism accumulates the sequence of the instructions into a single hash value that
represents the entire control flow of the Prover’s state. A Verifier, who has initially
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computed and stored a set of all the possible valid hashes of the Prover, can detect
control-flow attacks since a Prover targeted with a control-flow run-time attack will
report an unexpected hash value to the Verifier. This work is extended by Dessouky
et al. in LO-FAT [50] which presents a practical version of C-FLAT. Instead of the
software instrumentation used in C-FLAT, LO-FAT explores the features of the
microcontroller to intercept the instructions, providing in this way an implementation
of C-FLAT with low overhead. ATRIUM [107] proposes a hardware-based runtime
attestation protocol that is resilient against Time of Check Time of Use attacks.
ATRIUM attests both executed instructions and the control-flow. However, the
existing dynamic attestation protocols typically follow the one-device-attestation
approach and do not provide a complete evidence of the integrity of the services
that compose a distributed IoT system.
2.3.2 Collective attestation
In IoT systems, collective attestation schemes aim to verify the internal state of
a large group of devices in a more efficient way than attesting each of devices
individually. The large networks are often described as swarm network.
Swarm attestation. Asokan et al. propose SEDA [36] as an attestation approach
which constructs the interconnected network as a spanning-tree. In this scheme, each
device statically attests its children and reports back to its parent the number of
children that successfully passed the attestation protocol. In the end, an aggregated
report with the total number of the devices successfully attested will be transmitted
to the Verifier. The weakest point of this protocol is that a compromised node
can impact the integrity of the attestation result of all its children nodes in the
aggregation tree. This problem was later tackled in the work presented by Ambrosin
et al. [30]. There, the authors propose a scalable attestation protocol with untrusted
aggregators (SANA) which relies on the use of a multi-signature scheme. In SANA,
devices sign the attestation responses and an aggregation of the signatures is used
to validate the network in a constant time. In the aforementioned schemes, devices
interact synchronously during the attestation: each device attests its children and
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reports back to its parent the attestation report. Carpent et al. [43] proposed two
Lightweight Swarm Attestation (LISA) protocols, LISAα and LISAs which aim to
improve [36] regarding the scalability and the detection of physical adversaries. In
LISAα, which is the asynchronous version of the LISA protocol, the nodes are not
constructed in a parent-child relationship when they are performing the attestation.
Instead, in LISAα, nodes perform independently and simultaneously their own
individual attestation, and they collaborate only for propagating the attestation
requests and responses.
To release the assumption of the aforementioned collective attestation schemes
that the network is static and interconnected, Kohnhäuser et al. in SALAD [75]
and Ambrosin et al. in PADS [31] rule out this assumption and propose an efficient
protocol for highly dynamic networks. In these proposals, each device performs the
local attestation at the same point in time and shares the individual result with
other devices in the network. Then, devices use the consensus algorithm to gain
knowledge about the state of the other devices in the network. At the attestation
time, the Verifier can perform the attestation over a random device, which will
report the consensus state of the entire network.
In order to detect an adversary that physically tampers devices of an IoT network,
Ibrahim et al. proposed DARPA [66] which is able to detect invasive physical attacks
by following the assumption that an adversary needs to shut a device down for a
non-negligible amount of time in order to physically tamper the device. In DARPA,
each device periodically runs the protocol by self-generating “heartbeat” messages
from a secure local clock or by receiving a heartbeat message from its neighbours.
Once a device has a heartbeat message, it associates it with a timestamp, signs it
with its secret key and sends the result to the neighbours. This protocol follows the
approach used in [36] to aggregate the timestamp-based heartbeats of the devices. By
observing the final attestation report, the Verifier will be able to check whether all
the devices of the network have been present or not. Thus, DARPA allows the Verifier
only to detect the presence of a physical attack in a network, without identifying the
missing devices. This work has later been enhanced by Kohnhäuser et al. [74] who
proposed SCAPI in order to detect precisely the devices which have been physically
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captured. In SCAPI, some “leader” devices are responsible for generating periodically
new secret session keys. In order to receive the updated session key, devices should be
authenticated with their old session key and distribute the message to the neighbours
using the approaches on [30,36]. In this way, the physically compromised devices,
which will be turned off for a non-negligible time, will miss the latest session key,
and thus will not be able to get authenticated to send their messages. In this way,
the Verifier is able to detect precisely the physically compromised devices.
Nunes et al. propose Timely Collective Attestation (TCA) [101] and design a
Synchronous Attestation Protocol (SAP) based on the proposed TCA. The TCA
identifies the main design requirements for collective attestation schemes such as
adversarial model, network communication, device capabilities, and network topology.
SAP constructs the network of a group of devices as a balanced binary tree which is
rooted at the Verifier. At the attestation time, the attestation challenge is propagated
along the tree. When a device receives the challenge, it performs the attestation and
sends the result to its parent. Next, the parent performs its own attestation and XORs
the result with the attestation result received from the child. Finally, the Verifier
receives the completed XORed result of the group of devices and then validates
the report. However, the aforementioned collective attestation schemes verify only
the static program memory and do not detect run-time attacks. Additionally, these
collective attestation schemes do not consider the communication data exchanged
among devices.
Distributed attestation. Recent collective remote attestation schemes propose
different approaches that employ distributed Verifiers instead of the presence of the
traditional centralized Verifier. Ibrahim et al. proposed US-AID [64] as a collective
attestation scheme that allows the devices mobility within a given network during
the attestation phase. US-AID is an attestation mechanism for autonomous devices
for a dynamic network, in which devices mutually attest each other and keep the
snapshot of the network. There, during the attestation each pair of neighbour devices,
upon mutual authentication, will exchange their respective attestation result. In
this way, the autonomous devices store their respective neighbours attestation
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results which provide the network health status. Kuang et al. propose an Efficient
and Secure Distributed Remote Attestation (ESDRA) [81], which, to perform an
efficient attestation, divides large IoT networks into several clusters according to
the communication distance. Overall ESDRA considers the previous behaviors of
the devices in order to implement a reputation mechanism. For this, each Prover
in ESDRA gets attested by three different neighbours, which challenge the Prover
and then, based on the behaviour of the Prover, will record a corresponding score.
Next, the cluster-head will check the Prover’s corresponding score and report it
to the Verifier. Ibrahim et al. propose HEALED [65] as an attestation mechanism
which not only detects malicious devices but also "heals" the infected devices. In
HEALED, each device periodically acts as a Verifier and attests a random Prover.
HEALED constructs the segments of the Prover’s software as a Markle Hash Tree
(MHT), where the root of the tree is the measurement of the software state of the
Prover. Thus, a compromised code segment will generate a non-valid hash value
along the path to the MHT root. Later, the compromised parts will be replaced with
the legitimate code retrieved from another devices with the same software code.
Abera et al. propose DIAT [29] as a protocol in which the communication
data exchanged among two devices are authenticated along with the control-flow
attestation of the software module involved in generation of the data. DIAT associates
the communication data with an under approximated list of control-flow paths that
produced those data. Here, the execution path representation relies on Multiset
Hash (MSH). In DIAT, each device contains the valid approximated control-flow
paths and the verification is done for each pair of interacting devices. Thus, DIAT
requires each device P to store in advance the valid information of each other
device D, to which P will potentially communicate in the future. Additionally,
the adoption of MSH does not allow the precise verification of the control-flow
execution of the interacting services, but only an approximately one. Kohnhäuser
et al. proposed PASTA [76], an attestation scheme for autonomous devices that
enables the attestation of many Provers. Here, low-end embedded Provers collaborate
periodically to generate timestamped-“tokens", which in turn attests the integrity
of the joining devices and also detects “missing" devices. The tokens are validated
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using Schnorr-based multi signature.
2.3.3 Discussion
Different from the aforementioned remote attestation techniques, this thesis proposes
novel protocols that attest the trustworthiness of distributed IoT services. Unlike
single-device attestation protocols that attest only one single device, the protocols
proposed on this thesis attest distributed services that run on many devices. Unalike
existing swarm attestation protocols that do not consider the exchanged communica-
tion data, the protocols of this thesis aim to detect not only the compromised services
but also the legitimate services that are maliciously influenced due to the interactions
with a compromised service. Table Table 2.2 summarizes the contributions of the
protocols proposed in this thesis w.r.t. the gaps in the literature.
Table 2.2. Contributions w.r.t. gaps in the state-of-the-art
Scheme
Number Communication Synchronous Asynchronous Offload attestation
of devices data interactions attestation to cloud/fog
RADIS [48] Many 3 3 7 7
SARA [54] Many 3 3 3 7
RAaS [49] One 7 7 7 3
In order to detect the compromised devices, the existing distributed attestation
schemes rely on distributed Verifiers and validate the trustworthiness for each pair
of devices. Instead, the protocols on this thesis rely on the presence of a centralized
Verifier that knows the legitimate state of the devices and the legitimate interactions
of the devices among themselves. In this way, the proposed protocols are able to
check also the integrity of the devices that influence indirectly each other.
In addition, this thesis focuses on checking the integrity of the devices that have
indirectly influenced each other due to asynchronous interactions. For instance, in a
network where devices communicate through publish/subscribe protocols, a device
may receive simultaneous messages to act on. Considering the wide adoption of the
asynchronous mechanisms on large-scale distributed applications, the asynchronous
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attestation protocol become a fundamental necessity to provide secure evidence about
the asynchronous interactions between services and the exchanged data between
them. The existing remote attestation protocols do not consider such asynchronous
interactions.
Despite the advancement in remote attestation schemes, performing attestation
rather than usual work may not be practical for the scenarios where devices are
deployed in time-critical infrastructures (e.g., medical facilities, nuclear plants), that
require continuous monitoring. To make remote attestation applicable for real-time
applications, this thesis introducing the idea of reducing the overhead of remote
attestation by offloading the attestation computation to the cloud.
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Synchronous Remote attestation
In this chapter, we present a protocol for Remote Attestation of Distributed IoT
Services (RADIS), which verifies the trustworthiness of synchronous distributed IoT
services. RADIS introduces the idea of service attestation and it attests only the
services involved in performing a certain functionality. RADIS relies on a control-flow
attestation technique to detect IoT services that perform an unexpected operation
due to their interactions with a malicious remote service.
3.1 Motivation
The enormous expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices induces the necessity
of interoperable IoT systems. The IoT interoperability will allow heterogeneous IoT
devices to interoperate and ultimately to support the deployment of large-scale
IoT applications. However, due to the limited capabilities of the IoT devices to
adopt complex security techniques, IoT systems are increasingly exposed to a huge
number of potential attacks [77,89]. Hence, a security mechanism that guarantees
secure interoperation between devices plays a key role in establishing trust in an
interoperable IoT system.
26 3. Synchronous Remote attestation
Remote attestation is used as a security protocol that provides reliable evidence
about the trustworthiness of an untrusted device. Typically, the internal state of
resource-constrained devices comprises the program binaries stored in the program
memory of the device and the run-time state of the software stored in data memory.
During a software execution, the content of the program memory remains static,
whereas the data memory’s contents always change. Most of the existing remote
attestation protocols attest only the program memory, thus leaving undetected the
run-time attacks, which target the data memory and do not modify the program
memory of a device. For instance, a code-reuse attacker may exploit the Return-
Oriented Programming (ROP) technique [94] to change at run-time the control-
flow of genuine sequences of code (i.e., gadgets) loaded on the device’s memory
and, consequently, produce a malicious code execution. Other run-time attacks do
not change the control-flow of a software, but only the data of the software by
manipulating the data pointer through Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) [63]
technique. As the run-time attacks can become pervasive in IoT systems, some
recent remote attestation approaches [28,50,72] have been proposed in the literature
to check the integrity of the data memory. However, the existing run-time remote
attestation schemes can perform attestation only on single devices. Additional
research works [30, 31, 36, 75], which have proposed efficient protocols that run
attestation over a large number of devices, do not consider the communication data
exchanged among devices.
In this work, we focus on distributed IoT services, and we show that due to
the communication data exchanged between services, a compromised service can
affect the integrity of the other legitimate invoked services that interact with the
compromised one. In particular, a compromised service may maliciously deviate the
control-flow of the legitimate invoked services towards a valid but non-authorized
state. The naive approach of running a control-flow attestation protocol for each
service would not detect such control-flow deviation because the software of the
invoked service is genuine and the deviation is caused due to the corrupted input
received. To this end, our work considers interoperable IoT devices and aims to
check the integrity of distributed IoT services that run on these devices. We propose
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a remote attestation protocol that detects the control-flow deviation of legitimate
services, which is affected by an adversary who has not directly compromised this
service but has compromised another service that interacts with the former.
3.1.1 Contributions
In this work, we attest the trustworthiness of distributed IoT services. Unlike
single-device attestation protocol that attests a single device, our scheme attests
a distributed service that runs on many devices. Different from existing collective
remote attestation protocols that perform static attestation and do not consider the
exchanged communication data, our protocol traces the exact control-flow across
many IoT services that compose a distributed service. The contributions of this work
are threefold:
• We highlight the need for the attestation of distributed IoT services by demon-
strating that a compromised service in a distributed IoT service can induce
malicious behavior on genuine services.
• We define the required security properties for distributed IoT services and
describe the adversary model.
• We present RADIS, a remote attestation protocol for distributed IoT services
and provide the performance evaluation.
3.1.2 Chapter outline
We present the motivation of this work in Section 3.1 and explain the problem setting
in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we present the system model, and in Section 3.4, we
describe the adversary model and the required security properties. Next, we provide
the protocol details in Section 3.5. The evaluation of protocol is shown in Section 3.6
and security analysis in Section 3.7. Finally, the chapter concludes in Section 3.8.
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3.2 Problem Description
We consider an interoperable IoT system as shown in Figure 3.1, where different
IoT devices provide a set of services that interact together to perform a task. The
sequence of all the services involved in performing a task is called Service Flow, and
the notation for the Service Flow depicted in Figure 3.1 is Si1→ Sj3→ Sx2. The
set of services Si1 → Sj3 → Sx2 communicating with each other to support the
operation forms also a distributed service. Note that a given distributed service can
follow a different service flow based on different invocations, depending, for example,
on the input parameters.
Device i Device xDevice j
Si1 Sj1 Sx1 Sx2
Devices
Services
1 2 3
Input
Sj2 Sj3
Service flow
Figure 3.1. Service Flow of IoT devices
As a motivating example, we consider a Smart Home IoT system enabled by
the interoperation between services of three IoT devices: an Outdoor Camera, a
central Security Monitor, and a Smart Door. A motion sensing Outdoor Camera
observes outside the main door of the home, and when any movement of objects
or people is detected, the camera captures an image and reports it to a Security
Monitor. Once the Security Monitor gets the captured image, it analyzes the image,
and if it identifies a family member, it sends an unlock command to open the Smart
Door, as shown in Figure 3.2. The service flow in this scenario is: captureImage()
→ checkImage() → unlockDoor().
In order to verify whether individual devices are performing the intended software
execution, it is required the execution of a single-device control-flow attestation
protocol that detects subverted control flows. One possible example of such attestation
protocol is C-FLAT [28]. In the case the device is not compromised, a control-flow
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Figure 3.2. Device interaction in Smart Home IoT System
Device i: Outdoor Camera Device j: Security Monitor Device x: Smart door
1: captureImage() {
2: motion← sensor.value();
3: if motion then
4: img ←
camera.capture();
5: checkImage(img);
6: end if
7: }
1: checkImage(img) {
2: member ←
searchFamily(img);
3: if member is false then
4: cmd← false;
5: else
6: cmd← true;
7: end if
8: unlockDoor(cmd);
9: }
10: service: searchFamily()
1: unlockDoor(cmd) {
2: if cmd is true then
3: unlock();
4: else
5: lock();
6: end if
7: }
8: service: lock()
9: service: unlock()
Figure 3.3. Pseudo-code of the service flow in Figure 3.2
attestation protocol, running on a single device, will report the benign state of the
device. For instance, when a single-device control-flow attestation protocol attests
a genuine Smart Door, it will ensure its correctness. Now, consider an adversary
that attacks another device of the distributed service, e.g., the Security Monitor
device. In particular, the adversary can corrupt the security monitor’s data pointers
at run-time or modify the communication data yielded by the Security Monitor.
After this attack, a single-device control-flow attestation procedure executed on the
Smart Door will report again the correctness of the Smart Door. This is because
the adversary has not changed the software of Smart Door and has not deviated
its control-flow. However, even though the adversary is located only in the Security
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Monitor and the Smart Door passes all the checks of the control-flow attestation
procedure, we show that the Smart Door can be forced into an incorrect state.
Ni1
Ni2
Ni4
Ni5
Nj1
Nx1
Nx2
Nx3
Input 1
2
3
Device i Device j Device x
Control flow path
Service  Request 
Service init
Remote Service invocation
Control Flow Graph Nodes
Nx9
Nx5
Nx8
Nj10
Nj3
Nj4
Nx7
Nj2
Nj6
Ni3
Nj9
Ni7
45
Service  Response 
Sx2
Sj3Si1
Ni8
Figure 3.4. Control flow of the distributed service in Figure 3.2
By compromising the Security Monitor device, the adversary is able to generate
malicious software executions on the Security Monitor that can produce malicious
data and can influence the current behavior of the other interconnected devices. As
a consequence, the state of the Smart Door may be corrupted by the commands
invoked maliciously from the Security Monitor to the Smart Door. For example,
an unlockDoor() command initiated as result of an attack in Security Monitor can
open the door even if the camera has not captured the image of a family member.
We thus argue that the Smart Door may have a genuine software, but its behavior
is not legitimate if it is performing an unexpected operation due to the command or
input that it received from a malicious code executed in the Security Monitor device.
To detect this attack, one could think to run a single-device control-flow attesta-
tion protocol on every device of the IoT system. Indeed, the control-flow attestation
protocols, running on each individual IoT device, will detect the devices which
contain corrupted control-flow information on their data memory. Since the adver-
sary has modified only the value of one variable on the Security Monitor and has
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not performed any control-flow attack to any device, the control-flow attestation
protocols, running on each of the three devices of our scenario, would report all the
devices in a legitimate state. Hence, the control-flow deviation of the Smart Door
remains undetected.
To clarify the effect of an attack on a distributed service, in Figure 3.3 we
illustrate the pseudo-code of the three services involved in the aforementioned service
flow: captureImage() → checkImage() → unlockDoor(). Based on the instructions
of this pseudo-code, for each service is constructed a Control Flow Graph, where
each node of the graph presents an instruction, as shown in Figure 3.4. During the
usual operation, each service follows the intended control-flow and then invokes a
service call to the next device.
The adversary located in Security Monitor (Device j) performs an attack in Nj4
to maliciously assign the variable cmd with the value “true”. The service execution
will then proceed to Node Nj8 to call the service unlockDoor (cmd), as shown in
Figure 3.4. Note that when the execution flow reached at Node Nj4, the variable
cmd was assigned as “false”. The compromised argument cmd, produced by the
adversary in Security Monitor, is used in node Nx2 of Smart Door (Device x) as a
decision-making variable that defines the further operations of Smart Door. This
means that Smart Door, even though is running a genuine software, can maliciously
run unlock () command in Node Nx3 because of the compromised argument received
(Nx2 goes into Nx3 instead of going into Nx5).
Consider now another type of adversary that does not change the software of the
services, but modifies the communication data between Security Monitor and the
Smart Door. For instance, an adversary that is able to carry out a man-in-the-middle
attack in the network can modify the data between node Nj8 and Sx2 to set cmd
as “true”. Such adversary will still be able to deviate the control-flow of the Smart
Door even though the software of Security Monitor and software of the Smart Door
are both genuine.
The attacks described above show that a compromised device (Device j) induces
a malicious control-flow deviation into a subset of IoT devices, even though the
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software running on the subset of the devices is not altered in any way by the
attacker. Therefore, to produce a correct attestation response of a distributed service,
the attestation protocol should not only detect the compromised services, but also
the services that are performing a non-intended operation due to their interactions
with the infected service.
Note. The goal of our work is to verify whether a distributed services is perform-
ing an intended operation and we do not intend to check the integrity of the entire
data processed by each service. Considering that some data attacks can have only an
isolated impact on the overall operation of a distributed service, our protocol does
not consider the data attacks which impact neither the control-flow of an individual
service nor the control-flow of the invoked services.
3.3 System model
We consider a distributed IoT system, where each heterogeneous IoT device Di
provides a number ni of services. In a typical distributed IoT service, each service
invokes an explicit service request to another service according to a predefined
interaction model. A distributed IoT service may follow various service flows at
run-time„ thus, the aim of the attestation mechanism is to check the integrity of a
distributed service by verifying that a given service flow is legitimate. In modelling
the attestation scheme of a distributed IoT service, we consider the presence of the
following entities:
• Device Di: a number of interconnected devices that compose a distributed IoT
system. Each device hosts ni different services, each uniquely identified as Siu,
for 1 ≤ u ≤ ni.
• System operator OP : responsible for the trusted deployment of the distributed
IoT system.
• Verifier V rf : a trusted external party who checks the integrity of a service flow
of the distributed IoT system. V rf may be different from OP . V rf has access
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to the binaries of all the services deployed on the distributed IoT system. The
attestation runs periodically at an arbitrary time determined by V rf .
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Figure 3.5. System model of remote attestation of a distributed IoT service, which consists
of two services Siu and Sjv.
Initially, an IoT system operator OP validates the identities of the devices,
authorizes their access, and verifies the correct version of the software and services
available on them. Then, a Verifier V rf , responsible for the integrity check of the
distributed services, performs an offline procedure to measure all genuine services that
compose the distributed IoT system. During the service measurement procedure, V rf
considers the legitimate service flows and all possible legitimate control-flows of the
genuine services that compose a service flow. Next, V rf generates the measurement
for each service flow, and at the end of this procedure, V rf stores in a database
a single hash value for each legitimate service flow. A conceptual overview of our
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system model is depicted in Figure 4.3.
At the attestation time, V rf sends an attestation request 1 to the device hosting
the first service of a given service flow. Upon receiving the attestation request, the
device initiates the attestation process for the intended service 2 . During the
execution of the service, a run-time trace module traces all the instructions of the
services and invokes a hash module to compute an accumulative hash for the entire
control-flow path that the service follows at run-time. Then, each service invocation
comprises also the attestation result. This process binds all the services attestation
reports generated through the entire service flow 2 - 6 . After completion, the
first service of the service flow sends to V rf the final attestation report of the
entire service flow 7 . In the end, V rf validates the received result with the known
measurements stored previously in the database 8 . If the final attestation result
matches with one of the pre-calculated values, V rf ensures that the distributed
service is in the legitimate state. Otherwise, the distributed service is compromised.
3.4 Adversary model and Security Requirements
In this section, first we describe an adversary model in a distributed IoT service
setting, and then we define the required security properties for a distributed remote
attestation protocol.
3.4.1 Adversary model
The main goal of an adversary Adv is to compromise the execution or the results
of a distributed IoT service. Thus, the aim of remote attestation is to detect the
distributed services which are compromised or maliciously influenced by Adv. We
consider the following possible actions of an Adv against distributed IoT services:
• Software adversary. Adv can compromise the binaries of the services, can
inject malicious code in the free space of the program memory of a device, or
can exploit at run-time a service vulnerability to manipulate the data memory
of a device (e.g., by corrupting control-flow pointers or data pointers).
3.4 Adversary model and Security Requirements 35
• Communication adversary. Adv can eavesdrop on and alter the communi-
cation data between services. Adv will be particularly interested to alter the
communication data in such way that it will change the intended control-flow
of the invoked service.
• Replay attack. Adv precomputes the operations of the attestation procedure,
and reports to V rf a previous valid response which hides the attack.
Assumptions. Like in other attestation schemes, we rule out physical attacks,
and we assume that a software adversary cannot compromise hardware-protected
memory. While we do not consider Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, we limit these
attacks by using a symmetric key for the service invocations, thus, a device does not
perform intensive computations to refuse a fake service request. We also assume that
software attacks and Man in the middle (MITM) attacks impact the control-flow
of a service software. Furthermore, we rule out an adversary that relocates itself
without affecting the control-flow of the distributed services at the attestation time.
We also assume that services will respond during the attestation procedure. However,
since RADIS includes the attestation result in the service invocations, typically a
non-responding service will generate a timeout message, and consequently, the final
attestation result will not comprise the information about the non-responsive service.
3.4.2 Security requirements
In order to be resilient to the above attacks, the remote attestation scheme of
distributed services should satisfy the following security properties:
• Authenticity and integrity of services: The attestation scheme should
perform software integrity verification of a distributed service to guarantee that
the distributed service has not been modified by any software adversary. In
particular, the protocol should provide authentic and reliable evidence to prove
that at run-time a distributed service has followed a legitimate control-flow.
The attestation scheme should guarantee the integrity and authenticity of each
of the services that compose a distributed service.
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• Integrity of communication data: The attestation scheme should detect
the compromised state of distributed services when a MITM attack, which
alters the communication data between two distributed services, causes the
invoked service to execute a non-intended control-flow.
Each distributed service should be able to verify the trustworthy origin of
its inputs, and it should reject any service calls invoked by an unauthorized
device.
• Freshness: To be resilient to replay attack, any service should not be able to
reply to the attestation request of V rf with a pre-computed value that could
hide an ongoing attack on the service. Likewise, an invoked service should
prove to the calling service the freshness of the response it provides to the
caller.
3.5 Remote attestation of distributed IoT services: RADIS
3.5.1 Preliminaries
In order to achieve all security properties described above, our attestation scheme
requires the following components.
Signature scheme. A signature algorithm σ ← sig(sk;m) takes as input a
message m and a secret signing key sk and outputs a signature σ. A verification
algorithm {0, 1} ← vrfsig(pk;m,σ) verifies whether σ is valid or invalid on input
of a message m, a signature σ, and a public verification key pk.
Message authentication code (MAC). MAC is a pair of polynomial time
algorithms signMac() and verifyMac() such that µ← signMac(k;m) outputs a
MAC tag µ on input of m and k, and {0, 1} ← verifyMac(k;m,µ) verifies µ on
input of m and k.
Graph hashing. A Control Flow Graph represents the legitimate execution
flows of a given software. For instance, Figure 3.6 depicts two valid execution flows:
N1 → N2 → N4 and N1 → N3 → N4, where each graph node N1 .. N4 denotes
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a software instruction or a group of uninterrupted sequences of instructions, i.e.,
basic blocks. We borrow the hash engine from C-FLAT, which associates each
valid execution flow of a single device with a unique hash value, computing Hl =
Hash(Hl−1, Nl).
N1
N2 N3
N4
H1 = H (0, N1)
H2 = H (H1, N2) H3 = H (H1, N3)
 H4 = H (H2, N4) OR  H (H3, N4)
Figure 3.6. Hashing algorithm of Control Flow Graph
RADIS has two main operation modes: setup mode and attestation mode. Setup
mode is an initial procedure, executed only once, which allows trustworthy execution
of the remote attestation protocol. Attestation mode is a periodical procedure
initiated by V rf at an arbitrary time. In Table 3.1, we summarize the terms used in
RADIS.
3.5.2 Setup phase
Setup phase includes two operations: key setup and service measurement, executed
respectively by OP and V rf .
Key setup. To establish a secure communication between V rf and Prv, each
deployed device Di knows V rf ’s public key PKV rf and owns an asymmetric key-
pair (pki, ski). In addition, two devices Di and Dj that will interact in the network
establish a shared symmetric attestation Message Authentication Code (MAC) key
kij . The secret signing key ski and the shared attestation key kij are both stored
within hardware-protected memory, preventing untrusted parties from using these
keys. Alternatively, as a lightweight key exchanging scheme between devices can
be used a random key predistribution scheme [46, 56] which rely on probabilistic
key sharing among devices. The basic idea is that each device is initialized with m
keys, selected from a large pool of S keys, such that two random subsets of size m
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Table 3.1. Notation Summary of RADIS protocol
Term Description
OP System Operator
V rf Verifier of a distributed IoT system
SKV rf Secret key of V rf
PKV rf Public key of V rf
Di Device i
Prvi Prover i
ski Secret key of Di
pki Public key of Di
kij shared symmetric key between Di and Dj
Siu Unique name of a service running on Di
SFG Service Flow Graph
GHVi Global Hash Value stored in Di for the
control-flow execution of a service flow
Procedure Description
signMac(k;m) generates MAC tag on m
verifyMac(k;m,µ) verifies MAC tag µ on m using k
sig(sk;m) encrypts a message m using a secret key sk
vrfsig(pk;m,σ) verifies σ on m using public key pk
servatt() performs attestation for a given service
callatt() a calling service sends an attestation
request to an invoked service
respatt() reports attestation result from an invoked
service to a calling service
getrespatt() retrieves the attestation response from an
invoked service to a calling service
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in S will share at least one key with some probability p. Next, devices will perform
shared-key-discovery to find out which of other devices they share a key with.
Note that RADIS is independent from the underlying key management schemes
used in IoT devices. RADIS aims to attest a set of services that have already estab-
lished an interaction among themselves. Although probabilistic key predistribution
schemes do not guarantee a shared key among all parties, RADIS aims to attest the
set of devices that share a common key. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that two
device Di and Dj share a symmetric key kij . The key setup process between devices
is managed by OP , and the details of the key management scheme are out of scope
of this thesis.
Service measurement. Service measurement is a one-time-only procedure that
V rf performs offline to measure the legitimate service flows of a distributed service.
Service measurement procedure follows the assumption that V rf has access to the
binaries of all the services and V rf knows in advance the legitimate interactions
between IoT devices. First, V rf builds a graph, in which the nodes represent services
and the edges determine the execution order of the services in a distributed service.
Next, V rf builds the Control Flow Graph of every service and builds a Service Flow
Graph (SFG) to represent all the possible valid transitions that a distributed service
may follow at run-time. Then, starting from each valid transition, V rf executes a
measurement function to associate each legitimate service flow with a single hash
value as shown in Figure 3.7. Finally, V rf stores all the generated hash values in
a database. In this initial setup phase, although the measurement of the Control
Flow Graph can introduce high complexity, the V rf generates the measurements
offline, so the complexity of software measurement does not impact the performance
of the remote attestation procedure on the device. Moreover, a typical IoT service is
expected to be less complex than traditional applications, and V rf has sufficient
processing resources.
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3.5.3 Attestation phase
The attestation procedure starts with V rf who sends an attestation request Ch =
Siu, inputSiu, R, σV rf , where Siu is the name of the service to be attested, inputSiu
is the initial input for the given service Siu, R is a randomized nonce to ensure the
freshness of the communication, and σV rf is V rf ’s signature over Siu, inputSiu and
R (as shown in Step 1 in Figure 3.8). Upon receiving the attestation request Ch,
the device Di, which serves as a prover Prvi, verifies the signature by using the V rf ’s
public key PKV rf . If the signature is valid, RADIS protocol, which is running on
Prvi, invokes the procedure servatt (Step 2 ) to attest Siu with the provided input
inputSiu. Since Siu is the first service of the service flow, GHVi will be initialized
with 0. The invocation of servatt triggers the tracing of the execution flow of Siu,
to compute a hash value for each instruction, and to store the accumulated hash
value in GHVi.
A
B
D
C
Siu
E
F
G
Sjv
H
Control-flow path
Service Flow path
Service init
Node of CFG
H1 = Hash (0, Siu)
H2 = Hash (H1, A)
H3 = Hash (H2, B)
H9 = Hash (H8, C)
H4 = Hash (H3, Sjv)
H5 = Hash (H4, E)
H6 = Hash (H5, F)
H8 = Hash (H7, H)
H7 = Hash (H5, G)
H10 = Hash (H9, D)
Figure 3.7. Hashing procedure for a legitimate Service Flow in RADIS
When Siu invokes another service Sjv, the code of Siu that handles the service
invocation will be attested by the procedure callatt (Step 3 ). Among the arguments
of the service call, the service invocation will also include the attestation result
of Siu and a nonce Ri to initiate the attestation for Sjv. Specifically, to initiate
the request, callatt computes a MAC signature µi = signMac(kij ;msgi) over the
message msgi = Sjv ‖ outputSiu ‖ GHVi ‖ Ri, where Sjv is the name of the invoked
service, outputSiu is the output Siu which serves as input data in the service call,
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                         Verifier
            R ←{0,1}n;
            σVrf←sig(SKVrf; Siu  i⃦nputSiu   R⃦);
           
           vrfsig(pki; outputSiu, R, σPrv)
                       Device i
 if (vrfsig(PKVrf; Siu     ⃦inputSiu   ⃦R, σVrf)) then 
Begin
        GHVi  ⟵ 0;
 servatt(Siu, inputSiu, GHVi)
  Begin
         ∀ Nl ∈ CFG(Siu)
             begin
   GHVi  ⟵ Hash(GHVi, Nl);
             end
         return outputSiu    ⃦GHVi;
   End
callatt()
  Begin 
      Sjv ⟵  name of invoked service;
      Ri ←{0,1}
n;
      msgi ⟵ Sjv  o⃦utputSiu   G⃦HVi   R⃦i;
      µi⟵ signMac(kij; msgi);
   End
        
 
getrespatt()
  Begin
      if ( verifyMac(kij;msgj)) then
         outputSjv    ⃦GHVj    ⃦Ri ⟵ resp;
         GHVi   ⟵ GHVj;
   End
possibly more code to attest by calling 
again the procedures in 
 σPrv   ⟵ sig(ski; R   o⃦utputSiu   ⃦GHVi);
Result = { R, outputSiu, GHVi, σPrv}
Else 
        Reject Ch;
End.
                       Device j
    
      
  
         
if (verifyMac(kij; msgi, µi)) then
Begin
Sjv    ⃦inputSjv    ⃦GHVi    ⃦Ri ⟵ msgi;
res  ⟵ servatt(Sjv, inputSjv, GHVi);
outputSjv  G⃦HVj  ⟵ res;
respatt()
      Begin
       msgj ⟵ Ri    ⃦outputSjv    ⃦GHVj;
       µj ⟵ signMac(kij; msgj);
      End
      
Else 
       Reject req;
End.
Ch = {Siu, inputSiu, R, σVrf}
        req = {msgi,  µi}
         
  Result
resp = {msgj,  µj}
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2 3 6
Figure 3.8. The algorithm of RADIS attestation protocol
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GHVi is the attestation result of Siu, and Ri is a randomized nonce. On receiving the
service request, Dj uses kij to verify the MAC signature verifyMac(kij ;msgi, µi)
and prove the authenticity and integrity of the request. In case the service call
is valid, RADIS protocol running on Dj starts the attestations for Sjv by calling
servatt (Step 4 ) on the received input data. The code of Sjv which handles the
response will be attested by respatt (Step 5 ). Next, Di handles the response of
Dj by calling getrespatt (Step 6 ) and updates GHVi with the hash value GHVj
produced by Dj . After the response, in case Siu continues code execution or invokes
other services, RADIS will trigger again servatt, callatt, and getrespatt.
Upon a complete execution of all the service that compose a service flow, Prvi
retrieves GHVi stored locally, and it sends back to V rf the signed attestation result
σPrv =sig(ski;R ‖ outputSiu ‖ GHVi) (Step 7 ). V rf verifies the signature of the
response vrfsig(pki;R ‖ outputSiu ‖ GHVi ‖ σPrv)) and then proceeds with hash
validation. Since V rf has initially stored the valid hash for each service, to validate
the attestation response, V rf checks in the database whether GHVi is among the
legitimate hash values saved in the database. If it matches, then GHVi serves as an
evidence to prove that each service of the service flow is legitimate.
3.6 Experimental setup and evaluation
This section describes our experiments and presents the performance evaluation of
RADIS.
Recall from Figure 3.8 that RADIS protocol computes a hash value for every
running service in a distributed system, and it is composed of two main computations:
(1) the attestation of each individual service that composes a distributed service
(performed by servatt()) and (2) the service request invocation and the reply
obtained along with each remote service attestation (performed by callatt(), respatt(),
getrespatt()). The attestation for each individual service is performed based on the
control-flow of the service. As the complexity of this computation is similar to the
protocol described in [28], the complexity of the hash computation for the individual
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attestation is linear to the number of control-flow instructions that the service has
to execute. Considering that in RADIS, the hash computation for each service starts
either from an initial service (from 0) or from a previous calculated hash (as described
in Section 3.5), RADIS does not introduce additional overhead with respect to the
work [28] to compute the hash of each individual service.
However, in order to transmit the attestation result among services, RADIS
sends a hash value in every service call in addition to the standard parameters.
Due to the communication of the hash value, RADIS introduces an additional
overhead compared to the service calls where no attestation of distributed services
is performed. Considering that RADIS computes a single hash over a previous
calculated hash (as described in Figure 3.8, procedure servatt()), the hash length
remains constant despite the number of services that can compose a distributed
service. In the following, we describe the experiment and the evaluation of the
additional overhead that RADIS introduces.
3.6.1 Experimental Setup
To attest individual services, we developed a hash module and customized a trace
module1 to trace the control-flow at run-time. During execution, the customized
trace module invokes the hash module to compute and accumulate a single hash
value for each executed control-flow. We assume that an adversary will not be able
to disable or modify the trace module and the hash module. For a secure deployment
of the protocol on real devices, trace module and hash module can run within a
lightweight hardware-assisted secure environment based on ARM TrustZone.
In order to measure the overhead for transmitting a hash value in every service
call, we implemented a distributed service scenario composed of three services:
captureImage()→ checkImage()→ unlockDoor(). We implemented each service
in Python v3.6.3 using Python Flask v1.0.2. We deployed each service inside a
Docker container with 1GB RAM and 1.2GHz CPU running on Alpine Linux v3.8
1We customized trace which is an open-source python module
https://docs.python.org/2/library/trace.html.
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and establish a HTTP communication among the services. We use SHA-1 and SHA-
384 as a cryptographic hash function and a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) based on SHA-256 as a MAC in order to show the complexity and
computational overhead of the implemented distributed service.
3.6.2 Evaluation
For single service attestation, the overhead to compute a hash for the entire control-
flow of a service with 10 lines of code is ≈ 36 microseconds. We evaluated the
communication overhead of RADIS by measuring the run-time of distributed services
without performing the attestation protocol and with performing the attestation
with the two cryptographic hash functions, namely, SHA-1 and SHA-384.
Table 3.2. RADIS run-time in seconds (s)
Services No attest SHA-1 SHA-384
captureImage− checkImage 0.00383s 0.01164s 0.01213s
checkImage− unlockDoor 0.00441s 0.01211s 0.01298s
captureImage− checkImage− unlockDoor 0.00750s 0.02355s 0.02503s
From Table 3.2 one can see that the communication overhead of SHA-1 and
SHA-384 among two services is respectively ≈ 8 milliseconds and ≈ 9 milliseconds
with respect to the case of no attestation. While in the case of three services, the
communication overhead is ≈ 16ms for SHA-1 and ≈ 17.5ms for SHA-384. The time
of signature verification HMAC SHA-256 of each service is ≈ 1 millisecond, and it is
included in the measured run-time shown in Table 3.2. The runtime measurements
of RADIS are also shown in Figure 3.9 which illustrates a comparison of RADIS
performance for SHA-1 and SHA-384 for the services that compose the distributed
service of our case study application.
Our experiments show that the communication overhead between two services
is constant. Therefore, for a distributed service which comprises N services, the
overhead is linear in (N-1). Let Tnoattest be the time of interaction between services
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Figure 3.9. Comparison of RADIS performance for SHA-1 and SHA-384 for two and three
services in a distributed service
when no attestation is performed and Toverhead is the overhead of RADIS between
two services. The runtime TRADIS of the communication between N services in
RADIS can be given as TRADIS = Tnoattest + Toverhead ∗ (N − 1). The scalability of
RADIS for N services depends on scalability properties of the underlying architecture
of a distributed service. See Figure 3.10 that reports the overhead of RADIS for
SHA-1 in a various number of services that compose a distributed system. The
results confirm that the performance of RADIS is reasonable for attesting distributed
IoT services.
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Figure 3.10. RADIS performance in various number of services in a distributed system
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3.7 Security Analysis
This section presents some arguments to give an insight into the proof that RADIS
meets the security requirements described in Section 4.5.2.
Authenticity and Integrity of software: In RADIS, a trace module intercepts
the control-flow of each service at run-time and invokes a hash module to compute
a cumulative hash. Thus, Adv will not be able to execute an arbitrary code or
change the control-flow that will not be observed by the hash module. Following
the assumptions that the hash functions are collision-resistant, and that Adv cannot
disable or modify the code of the trace and hash module, then Adv will not be
able to generate a valid hash value for an altered control-flow. Additionally, RADIS
intercepts the service calls, and each invoked service first registers the attestation
result of the calling service, and then starts the execution. Hence, a data attack on
the calling service that produces a corrupted output which changes the control-flow
of the invoked service will produce an unknown hash value to V rf . As only RADIS
can access the secret signing key sk, the final attestation result is authenticated and
cannot be tampered by Adv.
Integrity of communication: Any changes of the communication data by Adv
that effects the execution flow of the invoked service will produce an unknown hash
value to V rf . The communication data between two devices is authenticated with a
MAC symmetric encryption kij . Given a secure MAC function, it will be infeasible
for Adv to forge the data without knowing kij .
Freshness: The freshness of the attestation is ensured by a randomized nonce
R sent by V rf , and randomized nonces Ri exchanged among device Di. Assuming
that the probability of sending a randomized nonce R, where R = Rold is negligible,
two different attestation results will not match. Therefore, V rf can detect the replay
attack.
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3.8 Conclusions and Open issues
While IoT systems become interoperable, an important challenge for the remote
attestation schemes is to guarantee the trustworthy state of the IoT services that
compose a distributed service. A secure interaction between devices is a key issue in
IoT systems, and in this chapter, we emphasize the need for a distributed services
attestation in IoT systems. We presented RADIS, as a protocol that provides a
comprehensive and reliable integrity check of a distributed service. Our solution
gives evidence about the trustworthiness of the services that compose a distributed
services and the interaction flow between services.
Since RADIS protocol attests distributed services in which services communicate
synchronously, the problem of attestation of asynchronous distributed IoT services
remains an open issue. In addition, the optimization of attestation computation for
resource-constrained IoT devices needs to be addressed.
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Asynchronous Remote attestation
To deal with real-time communication in a large-scale network of interacting services,
IoT applications mainly adopt publish/subscribe messaging pattern. In this chapter,
we focus on collecting timestamped historical evidence and tracing the invocation
of services in an asynchronous IoT system. We present a novel protocol for Secure
Asynchronous Remote Attestation (SARA). SARA enables the attestation of a group
of IoT devices without suspending their regular work for the entire attestation time
and performs the attestation of asynchronous distributed IoT services.
4.1 Motivation
Large-scale systems require scalable communication mechanisms that can deal with
potential network reliability issues. In IoT setting, asynchronous communication is
accepted as an effective communication method which allows the communication
among IoT devices that are decoupled in space (i.e., interacting parties may not
address directly each other) and time (i.e., interacting parties are not online at the
same time during the communication). For this reason, the major asynchronous
protocols which adopt the publish/subscribe paradigm [57,62] such as MQTT [4],
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DDS [5], AMQP [2] etc., are very popular and stable communication protocols in IoT
systems [52,71]. Also, the asynchronous protocols are de-facto present in real-life IoT
applications, for instance, both Google Core IoT1 and Amazon Web Services (AWS)
IoT2 adopt MQTT protocol to handle the communications among IoT services.
Due to the large number of interacting IoT services, the importance of the
operations that these services perform, and the lack of complex security protection,
the IoT systems are becoming a favorite target for cyberattacks. Many adversaries
aim to exploit these services to access sensitive information of the IoT devices,
disrupt their normal operation, and even corrupt the data and software to violate
the legitimate operations of the devices [77,87,103]. Remote attestation can serve
as a suitable security protocol to provide evidence about the integrity of individual
devices.
The execution of remote attestation protocol is typically uninterrupted, enabling
the detection of mobile adversaries which try to evade detection by getting relo-
cated during the attestation. The non-interruptibility is generally preserved even
for collective attestation protocols which attests a large number of devices syn-
chronously [29–31,36,47,48,75,86]. In these schemes, when a Prover A interacts with
Prover B during the attestation, Prover A has to wait for a response from Prover
B and then proceeds with further operations. Further, the integrity of the Prover
does not only depend on the integrity of the software and the data that are running
on Prover’s memory. The communication data exchanged among previous service
interactions also affect the current state of the Prover [29, 47, 48]. Therefore, an
important prerequisite for remote attestation protocols is to provide evidence about
the interactions and the communication data exchanged during these interactions.
In this chapter, we propose a novel protocol for Secure Asynchronous Remote
Attestation (SARA) of a group of devices that communicate among themselves by
publish/subscribe paradigm [57,62] to provide distributed IoT services.
1https://cloud.google.com/iot-core/
2https://docs.aws.amazon.com/iot/latest/developerguide/mqtt.html
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4.1.1 Contributions
Overall, SARA provides the following main contributions:
1. Asynchronous attestation. SARA performs the attestation of a group of IoT
devices without interrupting the normal operation of all the devices at the same
time. In particular, SARA considers the typical and most common scenario of
IoT systems where the interaction among devices is event-driven and follows
the publish/subscribe paradigm. The design of the remote attestation protocol
based on this paradigm allows a device that completes the local attestation to
resume its normal operation although the attestation may progress on other
devices.
2. Selective attestation. SARA allows the Verifier to establish both the trust-
worthiness and the legitimate operations of a portion of the IoT system by
interacting only with a subset of the devices in the network. For example, after
that SARA has collected asynchronously the historical data of the services
in a large-scale IoT system, the Verifier can interact only with the actuators
that perform the final action, to establish the trustworthiness of all the devices
involved in the provision of that specific service and verify their legitimate
operations.
3. Historical evidence. SARA aims at providing each Prover with historical
information about its own interactions with other IoT services. This allows
SARA to detect not only the malicious IoT devices, but also other devices
which are performing a non-intended operation due to their interactions with
the infected device. However, collecting historical secure evidence is particularly
challenging in event-driven asynchronous communication models because it
is difficult to predict the time and the order of the service interactions. In
this context, the existing approaches that aim to periodically check software
integrity and data integrity (e.g., in [44, 67]) will not be useful. Also, some
of the proposed attestation protocols that require the synchronization of
clocks between devices does not seem realistic in large IoT systems. In order
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to overcome the challenge of ordering asynchronous events, SARA uses the
concept of vector clock [59, 83] which enables the precise tracing of event
occurrences.
4. Performance evaluation. SARA is implemented in Cooja, the Contiki [6]
network simulator. The simulation results are promising, and demonstrate the
effectiveness of SARA for asynchronous IoT communication.
4.1.2 Chapter outline
We describe the problem setting in Section 4.2 and provide a background overview
in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we present the system model. In Section 4.5, we present
the adversary model and define the required security properties. Section Section 4.6
presents the protocol details. In Section 4.7, we provide the evaluation of the protocol
along with security analysis in Section 4.8. Finally, we discuss the proposed solution
in Section 4.9 and the chapter concludes in Section 4.10.
4.2 Problem Description
We consider an IoT system which involves many multi-functional IoT devices. Each
functionality offered by a specific device is performed by an independent software
component called Service. To determine the state of a service, we define a Service
as trustworthy when its software has not been modified by an attacker. We say
that a Service is performing a legitimate operation when the service is currently
performing an intended operation and the current operation is not maliciously
affected directly or indirectly by the previous interactions among services. A subset
of Services across an IoT system may interact among themselves and compose what
we call a Distributed IoT Service.
Figure 4.1 shows a toy example of a distributed IoT service in a smart city that
consists of four IoT devices: a Brightness sensor, a Smart bulb, an Electric power-hub
and a Fire sensor. For simplicity, we assume that each of these four devices runs
only one service. In general, a large-scale IoT application, such as smart cities, smart
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homes, connected cars, etc., can be seen as a collection of many devices running
many distinct distributed IoT services, each composed by many services that interact
with each other.
Fire sensor
Electric power
fire
 ale
rt
Smart bulbBrightness sensor
Verifier
Attest
Figure 4.1. Toy example of interacting services in a Smart city scenario
Here, a Brightness sensor monitors continuously the light intensity of the envi-
ronment and provides the measurements to the Smart bulbs of a building. Based
on the light intensity, a Smart bulb automatically turns on and off. When a Fire
sensor detects fire in a building, it will also send an alert to the nearby Electric
power-hub which will stop providing power to the building. As a consequence, the
Smart bulb will turn off. For simplicity, the goal of the Verifier in this scenario is to
check both the trustworthiness and the legitimate operations executed by the Smart
bulb device. Note that, the data received directly from the Brightness sensor and
indirectly from the Fire sensor define the correct behavior of the Smart bulb. For
example, even though it is dark and the light is off, the Smart bulb can still be in a
legitimate state if a fire alarm has happened. Consider an attacker that compromises
the Brightness sensor and influences maliciously the Smart bulb by reporting always
high light intensity which will affect the Smart bulb to remain turned off even in
darkness. Therefore, any of the existing remote attestation protocols that validates
only the program binaries and the data memory of the Smart bulb device, without
considering the exchanged communication data with the Brightness sensor, will
report the Smart bulb as not compromised even though the Smart bulb is in an
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incorrect state, that is, being off instead of on. In order to verify the trustworthiness
and the legitimate operation executed by the Smart bulb, the Verifier has to know
the previous interactions of the services that directly or indirectly affected the
current state of the Smart bulb. Note that the verification process of the Verifier is
particularly complex, since the Smart bulb could be correctly off if a fire alarm has
happened.
One crucial point has to do with the interactions that happen concurrently.
Consider for instance the abstract model of event-driven interactions among 5 services
depicted in Figure 4.2. Here, these services implement a distributed publish/subscribe
communication pattern where the publisher can multicast events (i.e., messages or
data) to subscribers. In Figure 4.2, Service 2 and Service 3 concurrently receive
an event from Service 1, while Service 3 is triggered by events of anyone of the
two services: Service 1 or Service 2. Thus, for a Verifier that checks both the
trustworthiness and the legitimate operations of Service 5, it is critical to determine
whether the interaction Service 1 → Service 3 has happened before or after the
interaction Service 2→ Service 3. Indeed, different order of these interactions may
possibly yield different results, and consequently the expected legitimate state of
Service 5 would be different. Thus, the legitimate state of a service depends on the
ordering of the service interactions.
Service 1
Service 2
Service 3
Service 4
Service 5
Figure 4.2. Overview of service interactions in publish/subscribe paradigm
One could think of solving such an ordering problem by relying on a centralized
publish/subscribe model [57], in which a broker receives all the events, assigns
a sequence order to each event, and routes the events toward the subscribers by
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enforcing the order. In realistic IoT scenarios, a publish/subscribe model consists
of multiple distributed brokers that route the events from publishers to subscribers
through different multi-hop paths. When distributed brokers handle overlapping
groups of subscribers, events ordering still remains an issue. For instance, when two
subscribers share several subscriptions managed by different brokers, each broker will
assign the same events with different sequence order which may differ among brokers.
Thus, the published events will be notified in different order to the subscribers. To
develop a solution that has general applicability, we consider completely decentralized
publish/subscribe model (with or without brokers), and we focus on a secure solution
to guarantee events ordering among IoT services.
In an event-driven interaction model, in which a publisher publishes an event
that triggers the next action, the occurrence of events is not predictable. Moreover,
the clocks in IoT devices are typically inaccurate which makes impossible the perfect
synchronization of different clocks among IoT devices. Even if the devices are initially
synchronized, their clock will drift. Given the different communication delays that
the event delivery may introduce, it is difficult to determine exactly when the events
occurred. However, it is fundamental for the Verifier to know what is the logical
sequence of the events interacting with a device, i.e., the order of occurrence of the
events and the data exchanged.
This chapter proposes a solution, in the context of the issues described above,
both to verify the integrity of the device D, and to detect if D has been maliciously
influenced by another compromised service.
4.3 Background
We now provide some background knowledge about Publish/Subscribe paradigm
and Clock Synchronization across IoT devices.
56 4. Asynchronous Remote attestation
4.3.1 Architectural properties of Publish/Subscribe
Large-scale distributed IoT applications usually implement Publish/subscribe com-
munication paradigm to enable the asynchronous communication among the services.
In a typical publish/subscribe communication pattern, publishers produce data in
the form of events, subscribers use subscriptions to register their interests on an
event or a pattern of events [57,62]. Each subscriber gets notified when a published
event matches at least one of its subscriptions. In principle, the interacting services in
a publish/subscribe paradigm are decoupled on space and time. This means that the
interacting services do not need to know each other and do not need to participate
on the interaction at the same time.
Publish/subscribe paradigm can be categorized in centralized and distributed
model. In a centralized publish/subscribe, publishers and subscribers are both
attached to a message broker which handles the implicit invocation of the services.
The IoT protocols such as CoAP [97], MQTT [4], AMQP [2] follow the centralized
approach. In practice, publish/subscribe protocols in large IoT systems may consist
of multiple distributed brokers such as MQTT brokers.
On the other side, other popular IoT protocols such as Data Distribution Service
(DDS) [5] rely on publish/subscribe pattern to provide a completely decentralized
architecture with dynamic service discovery that automatically establishes commu-
nication between matching peers. This model offers scalability, increases reliability,
and is suitable for efficient and secure data sharing.
Considering that the focus of this chapter is on checking the trustworthiness and
the legitimate operations of the asynchronous interactions among services, recording
events in the order of their occurrence is very important. When an IoT system consist
of multiple brokers, the order of the events handled on a single broker and across
different distributed brokers becomes fundamental. To preserve the generality of our
work, we assume that IoT devices employ distributed publish/subscribe model.
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4.3.2 Logical Clock Synchronization
Clock synchronization is an important procedure that allows a large number of
IoT devices to agree on the same time reference. In general, the accuracy of a
typical quartz-based oscillator is affected by the manufacturing imprecision and
environmental conditions to which the clock is exposed, in particular temperature [68].
These factors affect mostly the accuracy of the clocks deployed on IoT devices due
to their low-cost design and their usual exposure to environment. Since a global
reference time is usually not available for IoT devices and the local physical clocks
are not accurate, the clock synchronization among IoT devices is a challenging issue.
To get around the physical clocks synchronization problem, this chapter proposes
the usage of logical clocks, in particular, vector clocks. The concept of logical clock
(LC) was introduced by Lamport [82] to produce “happens-before" relation among
distributed events, in which a → b denotes that the event a happens before the
event b. Here, a function LC assigns an integer timestamp to events to satisfy the
condition: a → b ⇒ LC(a) < LC(b). In this way, the causally ordered events are
represented as a linearly ordered set of integers. This approach does not order every
pair of events, since there can be distinct events with the same timestamp.
Since Lamport’s logical clock does not allow a precise time-stamping of the
messages, we use vector clocks. Vector clocks (VC) [59, 83] enhance Lamport’s
logical clock by identifying precisely the events that are causally related. When
events are not causally related, they are concurrent. Overall, a vector clock algorithm
follows three basic steps:
• Each service Si maintains a vector clock V Ci, where the value V Ci[i] is initially
assigned to zero.
• When a service Si sends a message, it first computes V Ci[i] = V Ci[i] + 1, and
then includes V Ci with the message.
• Upon receiving a message with another vector clock OV C, Si will set:
(1) V Ci[j] = max{V Ci[j], OV C[j]}, ∀j ∈ [1..N ]
(2) V Ci[i] = V Ci[i] + 1.
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In our work, each service maintains a vector clock that is updated during a remote
attestation execution according to the aforementioned algorithm.
4.4 System model
We consider an IoT distributed system, in which devices adopt asynchronous com-
munication mechanisms by following a completely distributed publish/subscribe
communication pattern for the interaction among their services. Our system model
consists of the following entities:
• Devices (D): Each IoT device D provides many services. Each service instance
is identified by a unique id servID. Devices adopt publish/subscribe communi-
cation pattern to implement the interaction among services across the network.
One service can be both a publisher and a subscriber.
• Verifier (V rf): The Verifier is an external trusted party that verifies both the
trustworthiness and the legitimate operations of the services running on IoT
devices. We assume that V rf has access to the binaries of each service and
has precomputed the legitimate hash values for each genuine service. We also
assume that Verifier knows the legitimate interactions among services. This is
a realistic assumption since publish/subscribe protocols generally provide an
interface that handles the subscription process.
• Network Operator (OP ): OP guarantees the secure bootstrap of the software
deployed on each Di and the secure key distribution among devices at the
beginning of the IoT system operation.
The Verifier performs the attestation in two steps: initialization at time T0 and
attestation at time T1, as shown in Figure 4.3. During the initialization time, V rf
initiates the attestation procedure to one (or more) services which will be typically
publishers. (Step 1 ). Upon receiving the attestation request, the publisher performs
the local attestation process and publishes the attestation result together with the
data that it produces (Step 2 - 3 ). Consequently, every subscriber service which
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retrieves the published data will also perform the attestation (Step 4 ).
Publisher: P
Subscriber: S
Verifier
Time T0
Verifier
Time T1
Initiate attestation1 Compute: 
GHV1 = Hash(P)
2
Publish: 
Output data + GHV1
3
Compute: 
GHV2 =  Hash(S) + GHV1
4
Send a challenge5
6 Challenge + GHV2
initialization
Attestation
Figure 4.3. SARA system model
At attestation time, V rf sends an attestation request to one (or more) subscriber
services (Step 5 ) which will act as Prover for the entire distributed IoT service. Each
subscriber will report to V rf an attestation result that includes the attestation result
of all the previous services that were directly or indirectly involved in triggering
a given event to which the subscriber was registered (Step 6 ). Note that the
initialization and the attestation can be launched at any services of the IoT devices.
However, considering that the functionality of a distributed IoT service typically
flows from sensors to actuators, the Verifier’s action is more effective if the attestation
procedure starts from publishers and gets verified from subscribers.
4.5 Adversary model and Security Requirements
4.5.1 Adversary model
We consider the following possible actions of an Adv against distributed IoT services:
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Software adversary (Advsw). Adv can compromise the program binary of an
IoT service either remotely by introducing malware (i.e., remote adversary), or by
being present physically near (i.e., local adversary). In both the scenarios the Adv
can also eavesdrop or control the communications among services.
Mobile adversary (Advmob). Adv is intelligent and able to move be.tween different
devices within the IoT system in order to avoid being detected.
Replay attack. Any of the Adv listed above can also launch replay attack, that
is, Adv precomputes the results of the attestation procedure, and reports to V rf a
previous valid response which hides the attack.
Assumptions. Like in other remote attestation schemes in the literature, we
assume that Adv cannot compromise hardware-protected memory. In addition, a
Physical Adversary (Advphy) that is capable of physically manipulating the services
and Denial of service (DoS) attacks are out of our current scope. An adversary may
also delay or refuse to publish the result. However, if the Verifier expects that a
particular interaction happens in a predicted time interval, a long delayed message
will be noticed. Likewise, the Verifier can detect a missing interaction in case the
service does not publish the data.
Device trust assumptions. Following common assumptions reported in the
literature, we assume the presence of three trusted components that reside on a
device:
• Read-Only Memory (ROM): Memory region in ROM where is loaded the code
of attestation protocol SARA along with the attestation-related details.
• Secure Key Storage: Memory region that stores keys and is read-accessed only
by SARA. This memory region is generally not updated during attestation.
• Secure writable memory: Memory region that can be read-write accessed only
by SARA and is used to securely store the vector clock value.
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The aforementioned memory regions are secure and can be accessed only by autho-
rized entities.
4.5.2 Security requirements
Any asynchronous remote attestation protocol for IoT services should satisfy the
following security properties:
Trustworthiness of services. The protocol should provide secure evidence to
guarantee the integrity of each individual service that compose a asynchronous
distributed IoT system.
Legitimate operations. The protocol should provide timestamped evidence such
as: the previous interactions, the interactions timestamp, and the exchanged data.
In this way, the Verifier will be able to verify the legitimate operation of the Prover
as defined in Section 4.2.
Freshness. The protocol should be able to detect a compromised service that
reports a precomputed value that could hide an ongoing attack on the service.
4.6 Asynchronous Remote Attestation: SARA
SARA consists of three main phases: (1) Deployment and measurement, (2) Attesta-
tion, and (3) Verification. We present the notation of SARA in Table 4.1, and in the
following, we provide comprehensive details for each of the phases of the protocol.
4.6.1 Setup phase
Setup phase is an offline phase for deployment and measurement that is performed
to guarantee a secure setup of the devices on an IoT system before the attestation
procedure. A network operator OP is responsible for deploying the devices in a
secure manner. Moreover, OP is responsible for the key management of the network
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Table 4.1. Notation Summary of SARA protocol
Term Description
V rf Verifier
Di IoT Device i
P ID of a Publisher
S ID of a Subscriber
servID Unique ID of a service
LHVP Local Hash of the service P
GHVP Global Hash of the service P
GHVprev Global Hash of previous service
interactions
PKV rf Public key of Verifier
SKV rf Secret key of Verifier
kps shared key among service P and S
At Number of active services
at time t
Procedure Description
Enc(pk;m) encrypts a message m with a public
key pk
Dec(sk;m) Decrypt a message m with a secret
key sk
σ ← sig(sk;m) signs a message m using a secret
signing key sk and outputs
a signature σ
{0, 1} ← vrfsig(pk;m,σ) verifies validity of σ on a message
m using public key pk
attest() performs attestation of a service
publish() include attestation result on the data
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and the installation of the secure applications on the device. A trusted external party
called Verifier V rf knows the installed version of the applications on the devices
and has access to the device binaries. During the measurement, V rf measures all
the legitimate states of each services running on a device. In addition, the Verifier
knows the services that are publishers and subscribers and the legitimate interactions
among them.
Key management. We assume that V rf uses an asymmetric key-pair
(SKV rf , PKV rf ) to communicate to each Prover. For simplicity, we assume that each
Prover uses an asymmetric key-pair (SKPrv, PKPrv) to communicate to the Verifier
and to other devices. In Section 4.9 we describe the alternative key management
schemes that devices may potentially adopt to communicate among themselves.
4.6.2 Attestation phase
Clock Synchronization. As we discussed in Section 4.3, it is challenging to have
the clock counter synchronized among devices. Therefore, we adopt the concept of
vector clock to obtain a consistent view of time across all the services in an IoT
system. In the logical vector clock model, initially all clocks are set to zero. From this
moment onward, each time a service sends a message, it increments its own logical
clock in the vector by one and then sends a copy of its own vector. To preserve the
generality of our protocol SARA, we use the term timestamp to refer to the vector
clock of a given service at a given time. Note that in our approach timestamp is not
the taken from the physical clock, it is an array that represents the vector clock. We
assume that timestamp is running in a protected memory and can be updated only
by SARA.
Attestation. To describe the attestation protocol, we assume that an asyn-
chronous distributed IoT service is composed of two services: a publisher P and a
subscriber S. Each service takes an input from another service or from the sensed
data. Figure 5.4 depicts SARA’s algorithm for attestation of asynchronous distributed
IoT services. At time T0, the V rf initiates the attestation protocol by sending an
attestation challenge to P (Step 1 ). Upon receiving the challenge, P reads an
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         Verifier
Time T0     
R  ⟵{0,1}n;
σVrf←sig(SKVrf; P ||  R);
  
   
    
   
vrfsig(PKS ; msg, σPrv)
Time T1      
R  ⟵{0,1}n;
σVrf ⟵sig(SKVrf; S  || R);
                      
vrfsig(PKS ; GHVS, R, σPrv)
                                          Publisher P
            
            if (vrfsig(PKVrf; P  || R, σVrf)) then
            Begin
if (timestampP is null) then
    timestampP [P] = 0;
ServID ⟵ P;
GHVprev ⟵ 0;
InputP  ⟵ read();
OutputP  ⟵ exec (ServID,  Input );
attest()
                Begin
                    LHVP⟵ checksum(P );
       timestampP [P] ⟵ timestampP [P] +1;
       τ⟵ ServID || timestampP || LHVP ||
 || OutputP || InputP  || GHVprev;
       GHVP ⟵ Enc(PKVrf; τ);
   End
publish()
   Begin 
                      msgp ⟵ OutputP || GHVp || timestampP ;
                                    σp⟵ sig(SKp; msgp);
                 End
           Else 
     Reject Ch;
           End.
       
                  Subscriber S
    
        
         
        
If (vrfsig(PKp; msgP,  σP)) then
Begin
If (timestampS is null) then
            timestampS [S] = 0;
ServID ⟵ S;
OutputP || GHVp || timestampP ⟵ msgP;
for (i=0; i< length(timestampp); i++) {
   timestampS [i] =  
       max(timestampp [i], timestamps [i]);
}
InputS ⟵ OutputP;
GHVprev⟵ GHVp;
OutputS ⟵ exec (ServID, InputS );
attest()
   Begin
      LHVS⟵ checksum(S);
      timestampS [S] ⟵  timestampS [ S] + 1;
      τ⟵ ServID || timestamp || LHVS || 
 || OutputS || InputS || GHVprev;
      GHVS⟵ Enc(PKVrf ;  τ);
  End
Else 
Reject data;
 End.
 /* optional */
publish_to_verifier()
Begin
   timestampS [S] ⟵  timestampS [ S] + 1;
   msg ⟵ OutputS || GHVS || timestampS;
   σPrv  ⟵ sig(SKS ; msg );
End
if (vrfsig(PKVrf; S  ||  R, σVrf)) then
       
σPrv  ⟵ sig(SKS ; R  ||  GHVS );
                  
       
   Ch = {P, R, σVrf}
data = {msgP,  µP}
 Result = {GHVS, R, σPrv}
1
2
3
4
6
  Ch = {S, R, σVrf}5
 Result = {msg, σPrv}
Figure 4.4. The algorithm of SARA attestation protocol
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input from environment and registers the input to InputP . SARA uses GHV to
accumulate the attestation results among interacting services. Since P is not triggered
by any previous service, SARA sets GHVprev = 0. Afterwards, P performs its own
operation, registers the output data to OutputP , and then starts attestation. The
attestation procedure (Step 2 ) consists on computing the checksum3 of P’s program
binary which gets assigned to LHVP . Then, P increments by one its timestampP
and computes = servID||timestampP ||LHVP ||OutputP ||InputP ||GHVprev. This in-
formation will serve as a complete evidence of service P for the Verifier and does
not need to be accessed by other services. Therefore, SARA encrypts this evidence
with PKV rf and assigns it to GHVP .
When P publishes a message (Step 3 ), P computes a message msgP =
OutputP ||GHVP ||timestampP and signs this message with SKP . Once S gets the
signed message from P , S verifies the signature of the received message and stores
the input and timestamp sent by P . Next, S gets executed on the received input and
uses the received timestamp to update its own timestamp timestampS following the
vector clock algorithm explained in Section 4.3.2. Next, S triggers the attestation
procedure (Step 4 ), increments by one its corresponding value of the vector clock
and computes GHVS . An abstract overview of this process is shown in Figure 4.5.
At time T1, V rf will send an attestation request to S (Step 5 ). Upon verifying
the request, Service S will send to the Verifier the GHVS (Step 6 ). Optionally, the
V rf can register its subscription to S. In this case, when S completes the attestation,
S executes the function publish_to_verifier() in order to send the final attestation
result GHVS to V rf .
4.6.3 Verification phase
In SARA, the verification starts when the Verifier retrieves the attestation result
GHVS from service S which acts as a Prover (see the interaction at time T1 shown
in Figure 5.4, where service S is called subscriber). Along with the timestamped
3Note that the checksum can be replaced with the protocol that performs data-memory attestation,
however, it does not affect the generality of SARA.
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attestation result of S, GHVS contains also the timestamped attestation result of
previous interacting services i.e., P . In order to read the evidence GHVS , the Verifier
uses its own secret key SKV rf to decrypt the attestation result of each service
included in GHVS . Then, the V rf uses the timestamp of each attestation result to
construct accurately the interaction order among services P and S (i.e., P caused
S). Next, the Verifier verifies the checksum of each service P and S that has been
included in the evidence GHVS and checks the exchanged data among these services.
Publisher: P
Hash of previous 
service (GHVprev) Input Output Timestamp
Hash of current 
service (LHVP)
Input  Hash of previous 
service = 0
Start
Subscriber: S
GHVP
Hash of previous 
service (GHVprev) Input Output Timestamp
Hash of current 
service (LHVP)
GHVS
Figure 4.5. SARA approach
For instance, consider the service interactions in Figure 4.2 where the Verifier
collects the final attestation result from Service 5. In this scenario, the attestation
result may contain two different sequences of services: (1) Evidence 1: Service 1→
Service 3→ Service 4→ Service 5, or (2) Evidence 2: Service 1→ Service 2→
Service 3→ Service 4→ Service 5 (see Figure 4.6). The V rf uses the timestamps
to construct a graph with the accurate interaction order of the services. By checking
the checksum of each service and the exchanged communication data between them,
the V rf detects the compromised services.
Once a compromised service is detected, the Verifier will identify the cases when
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the occurrence of a compromised service has caused the malicious execution of other
services. In particular, the identification of services that directly or indirectly have
influenced the current state of the Prover relies on the properties of the vector clock
mechanism that represent the casuality among events [59, 83]. According to the
vector clock implementation, each service has a vector of pairs (j, k), where j is the
service’s id and k is number of the events the service j produced. The Verifier claims
that Service P has influenced the state of Service S, if all the pairs of the vector
clock of P (i.e., V CP ) have a k value less or equal to the corresponding k value in
the vector clock of S (i.e., V CS), and at least one k value is smaller:
V CP < V CS ⇔ ∀j, V CP [j] ≤ V CS [j]
∧ ∃ j′ | V CP [j′] < V CS [j′]
(4.1)
where V CP [j] denotes the value of k in the pair (j, k) of the vector clock V CP .
For example, note the scenario in Figure 4.6 where the Verifier retrieves the
Evidence 2 from Service 5 and detects a non-valid checksum reported by Service 2,
associated with the timestamp V C2 = [(1, 1), (2, 1)]. In this case, the Verifier will
identify those services “X" included in Evidence 2 (i.e., services 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), for
which V C2[1] ≤ V CX [1] ∧ V C2[2] ≤ V CX [2], and ∃ j′ such that V C2[j′] < V CX [j′].
Note that when a pair (j, k) is missing in the vector, the value k is considered
as 0. From Figure 4.6 we see that V C2[1] = V C ′′3 [1] ∧ V C2[2] = V C ′′3 [2], while
V C2[3] < V C ′′3 [3]. Thus, in this case V C2 < V C ′′3 (i.e., Service 2 caused Service 3).
Likewise, we notice that V C2 < V C ′′4 and V C2 < V C ′′5 . Thus, from Evidence 2
the Verifier identifies that the compromised Service 2 has influenced Service 3,
Service 4, and Service 5.
In addition, the vector clock allows the service interactions to be represented
as a direct acyclic graph (DAG). This derives from the definition of vector clocks
properties, in which the values can only be incremented (see Section 4.3.2). At
the time of attestation, a malicious service might attempt to evade the detection
by sending precomputed legitimate data to other services. In this case the “used"
timestamp (i.e., vector clock) is old and it will create a cycle in the final graph that
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Figure 4.6. Overview of service interactions in publish/subscribe paradigm
the Verifier constructs. Thus, DAG structure of vector clocks allows the Verifier to
detect a replay attack by identifying the presence of a cycle in the DAG graph.
4.6.4 SARA working mechanism
In this section, we provide a simplified explanation of the attestation procedures
of SARA (described in Section 4.6) using finite-state machine (FSM) diagrams. In
SARA, the main entities that operate to perform attestation are the V rf and the
device Di, which runs one or many services.
Interaction: SARA-Verifier
The V rf in SARA performs the following main actions:
• Initialization: The V rf initializes the attestation process at a random time.
• Sending challenge: The V rf sends the attestation challenge to any of the
services in Di to initiate the attestation.
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• Report collection: The V rf collects the attestation result from any of the
devices in the network at any random point of time (i.e., after the initialization
of the attestation).
• Verify: The V rf verifies the attestation result received from the device(s) in
the network.
Initialize 
Attestation
Send 
challenge 
to a Service
Collect 
Attestation 
Report
Start
Verify
FSM of Verifier 
Figure 4.7. SARA FSM for Verifier
Interaction: SARA-Prover
In SARA, the Prover has four main functions as follows:
• Receiving challenge: Prover(s) takes part in attestation process once it receives
the attestation challenge from the Verifier.
• Perform attestation: Upon receiving the attestation challenge, the Prover
performs attestation by computing the checksum over the program binary.
• Global Hash Operation: The Prover computes the global hash by including
GHVP = servID||timestampP ||LHVP ||OutputP ||InputP ||
GHVprev, where timestampP is the current timestamp, LHVP is the hash of
the program binary of the current service P , Output is output of the current
service, InputP is the input of the current service and GHVprev is the previous
hash value.
• Publish: The current service publishes the global hash.
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Global hash 
computation
Figure 4.8. SARA FSM for Prover
4.7 Experimental setup and evaluation
In this section, we present our simulation environment and evaluation results.
4.7.1 Experimental setup
We evaluated SARA on realistic (random) networks using the Instant Contiki
environment, and in particular, the Cooja simulator [6]. Cooja is a platform that
can be used to emulate networks of resource-constrained devices, communicating
with realistic protocols. We used Cooja to investigate the robustness of SARA
in a scenario where devices (i.e., Provers): (1) run one or multiple services, (2)
are resource-constrained, and (3) opportunistically communicate using the IEEE
802.15.4 protocol. Even though mobility is not our main focus, we modelled Prover’s
mobility by randomly deploying Provers over a simulated area of 100× 100 m2. Each
Prover repeatedly selects a random speed as well as random direction. The random
movement of Provers make the network dynamic and loosely connected.
We simulated the execution of SARA on a network of Tmote Sky devices [1]. The
Tmote sky is equipped with a 16-bits 8 MHz MCU, 10 KB of RAM, and 48 KB of
non-volatile memory. Communications among services in SARA are carried out over
the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer protocol and use 6LoWPAN as an adaptation layer
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(using Contiki modules). This configuration is very popular in IoT settings [30,32,36].
IEEE 802.15.4 is a wireless standard that supports up to 250 Kbps data rate, 75 m
coverage and 127 B frame size.
4.7.2 Evaluation
In the following, we present our evaluation results in terms of runtime, energy-
consumption, and memory-consumption.
Runtime
SARA considers that communication among different devices is asynchronous, thus,
each device can receive or send multiple messages concurrently.
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Figure 4.9. Runtime of SARA, varying number of services
In order to provide an idea of runtime of SARA, we present a simulated result of
runtime for 250 services which communicate asynchronously among themselves. In
our simulation environment of 250 services, SARA takes ≈ 19 seconds to perform
attestation for the whole network. Figure 4.9 shows the runtime for SARA over a
network comprising an increasing number of services from 50 to 250. The result
proves that SARA is lightweight and does not introduce significant overhead during
the attestation.
Although, SARA’s runtime grows linearly, nevertheless, SARA shows a remark-
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ably manageable overhead for large networks. This makes SARA a realistic remote
attestation technique for practical IoT applications.
In addition, we provide a runtime comparison of SARA over a IoT network
of 100 services by deploying these services on skymote [1], ESB4 and Z15. We
measured SARA’s overhead for three different cryptographic functions: SHA-256,
AES and MD5 and present comparative runtime differences of skymote, ESB and
Z1 in Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12. Considering the runtime for all three
different cryptographic functions, skymote performs better than ESB and Z1 mote
even though the differences among the three motes are negligible. The simulation
results show that SARA can be employed by any sensor motes on real networks.
25 50 75 100
Number of Devices
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
22.5
25.0
Ru
nt
im
e 
(s
)
Comparison of motes that use MD5 encryption
SKY
ESB
Z1
Figure 4.10. SARA comparison for varying number of services when motes use MD5
encryption
Figure 4.13 shows the Average Packet Delivery Ratio (APDR) of SARA with
increasing simulation time in a network of 200 nodes. The messages considered for the
simulations include attestation messages along with usual network communication
messages among nodes. For our simulation purpose we use “UDGM: constant loss for
message communication" (provided by Contiki platform) among nodes in SARA. The
APDR is shown w.r.t. SHA-256, AES and MD5 encryption schemes. The performance
among these schemes are not substantially different from each other.
4http://contiki.sourceforge.net/docs/2.6/a01781.html
5https://zolertia.io
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Figure 4.11. SARA comparison for varying number of services when motes use SHA-256
encryption
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Figure 4.12. SARA comparison for varying number of services when motes use AES
encryption
Figure 4.14 shows the runtime variation of SARA w.r.t. increasing simulation
area and cryptographic measures using Tmote sky nodes. As expected, time required
to perform attestation over a large network will increase. The simulated experiments
show that 200 network devices (each device provides one service) requires ≈ 25 to 30
seconds (for 200×200 m2) to ≈ 58 seconds (for 600×600 m2) to perform attestation
for the entire network. The significantly higher time required is due to distance
related packet loss which also affects the APDR of the network.
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Figure 4.14. Runtime of SARA, varying simulation area
Energy Consumption
We measured the energy consumption for SARA based on the energy required to send
and receive one byte of data and the energy required to perform the cryptographic
operation for attestation process. Let Esend be the required energy to send a byte,
Erecv be the required energy to receive a byte, Egh be the required energy to calculate
global hash, Emac be the required energy to sign the message, Emsg be the energy
required to communicate the attestation result, Eatt be the energy required to
compute checksum, and N be the total number of services participating in the
attestation. Then, the required energy to send a message in SARA is:
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EDisend ≤ Emac + Egh + Emsg.
Similarly, the required energy for receiving messages in SARA is:
EDirecv ≤ Emac + Egh + Emsg.
In an asynchronous network that consists of N number of services, the V rf aims to
attest a subset of services (At). The overall energy consumption for the subset of
services attested in SARA is given as follows:
EDiSARA ≤ Eatt + Emac + Egh + EDisend + (Emac + EDirecv) ∗ (N ∩At).
We compute the energy consumption based on standard Contiki measurement6.
The CPU energy consumption are demonstrated in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Energy Consumption of SARA Simulation on Sky motes
Time (In sec) CPU Energy consumption (mJ)
10 0.58503296
20 0.1965921
30 0.38838043
40 0.39161316
50 0.39992157
60 0.19716614
Based on our simulation results, the energy consumption of the nodes performing
SARA is low and, SARA does not introduce a significant overhead for the energy
consumption of the nodes that are performing attestation. Given that IoT nodes
are resource-constrained, the energy consumption results confirm that SARA is an
appropriate attestation protocol for these devices.
6http://thingschat.blogspot.com
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Memory consumption
We simulated our experiment using Tmote sky which has memory of 48k Flash +
1024k serial storage7. In our experimental setup, each Prover (Di) needs to store
at least the (1) services running on the particular device; (2) key pairs (ski and
pki); (3) Local hash for recording the result at attestation time; (4) Global hash
value. Thus, in our experimental setting the storage cost for SARA in a random
device is 3.03 KB of storage for the services (i.e., running by skymotes) and 93B for
storing the local hash and global hash. Nevertheless, the memory consumption can
vary based on different size of services and cryptographic choices. However, Tmote
sky node has considerable amount of memory which can contributes to scale the
operation based on future need.
4.8 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security guarantees of SARA in satisfying the security
properties introduced in Section 4.5. In an asynchronous distributed IoT service,
the goal of an Adv is to compromise and/or affect maliciously one or more services
and evade detection from the V rf . Our main objective is to prove that it is com-
putationally infeasible for an Adv to forge the attestation result and persuade the
V rf .
Trustworthiness of services. An Advsw can attempt to manipulate remotely
the program binary of Prover(s). By infecting one service, the adversary can create
a cascade effect and maliciously affect other services. Following the assumptions
that the attestation code in SARA runs inside a hardware-protected memory which
cannot be modified by Advsw, then the checksum performed by SARA will be able to
report the Advsw that compromises the program binary of any service. In addition,
the output of checksum is encrypted with the public key of the V rf , PKV rf . Given
a secure encryption function, it will be infeasible for other interacting services to
modify this checksum output.
7http://www.snm.ethz.ch/Projects/TmoteSky
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Legitimate operations. For each services, SARA stores the current timestamp,
the input and the output of the given service, along with the checksum. Following
the assumption that SARA is able to securely intercept the input and output data,
SARA securely stores these results in ROM memory that is not modifiable by a
Advsw. At the end of the attestation procedure, the V rf will receive the attestation
result that reports for each executed service the checksum, the timestamp, and the
exchanged communication data. By checking the checksum of each service and the
exchanged communication data between them,the V rf detects the compromised
services. Following the assumption that the timestamps are stored in a secure
writable memory, the Verifier is able to identify all the compromised services and
their malicious impact over other services. Such an identification of the services
relies on the properties of the vector clock mechanism that represent the casuality
among events. Thus, SARA guarantees the legitimate operations of asynchronous
distributed IoT service against a software adversary (Advsw). In addition, SARA is
able to detect a mobile adversary Advmob that tries to evade detection by changing
location. Since SARA attests the program binary along with the communication
data, when the Advmob gets relocated across different the services, the historical
evidence will report the adversarial presence.
Freshness. Adv can launch a replay attack to evade detection by sending
precomputed valid attestation results. However, in SARA all the services include
timestamps maintained by the vector clock (as discussed in Section 4.3) with their
published output. This evidence allows the V rf to construct a graph using the
timestamps included in the attestation report. When all the service interactions
occur in a legitimate timestamp, the service interactions can be represented as a
directed acyclic graph (DAG) (as discussed in Section 4.6.3) in which timestamps
are the edges and services are the vertices over the attestation report. The presence
of a loop in the graph will represent the usage of an old timestamp and will allow
the V rf to detect the cases when the Adv launched a replay attack.
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4.9 Limitations
In SARA, each service stores a timestamped evidence, encrypts this evidence and
then sends it to other services. SARA stores such evidence for each service interaction.
Bounding the length of the attestation evidence. While SARA allows the
Verifier to accurately reconstruct historical attestation evidence, the length of the
attestation evidence increases with the number of the services that are executed. In
real IoT scenarios, the de-facto communication protocols (i.e., 6LoWPAN, ZigBee
etc.) provide a maximum packet length of 128 Bytes out of which 102 bytes can
be used for data transfer [51]. In a large network (e.g., with more than N devices),
this packet size will be insufficient to transmit whole network attestation results.
Thus, devices need to send multiple packets, which will eventually increase their
energy consumption. One promising direction to bound the length of the attestation
evidence in SARA could be the possibility of flagging some of the services in the
IoT network as cluster-heads. In this approach, the cluster-heads are pre-configured
with the maximum length of the evidence. The cluster-heads check the cases when
the length of the attestation results exceeds the maximum predefined length-limit
and then notify the Verifier.
The Verifier communicates with the cluster-heads through the publish/subscribe
protocol. Specifically, upon initiating the attestation procedure, the Verifier will
register a subscription to the cluster-heads. The Verifier chooses as cluster-heads those
services that are more likely to be called based on the potential service interactions
for a given attestation procedure. Once the length exceeds a predefined length limit,
the cluster-heads will notify the Verifier. The cluster-heads publish the attestation
result to the Verifier according to the function publish_to_verifier() as shown in
Figure 5.4. The freshness of the attestation result published from the cluster-heads is
guaranteed by the vector clock mechanism which gets incremented by one when the
function publish_to_verifier() is getting executed. Upon receiving the attestation
results from the cluster-heads, the Verifier can immediately decide to re-initiate the
attestation procedure starting from the cluster-heads in order to check the rest of
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the services that have not been attested yet. In this case, the attestation will be
initialized using the latest vector clocks published by the cluster-heads, thus, at the
end the Verifier will still be able to reconstruct a complete history of the service
interactions.
As an alternative way of bounding the length of the attestation evidence and
reducing the computational cost of signing attestation results, SARA could adopt
the usage of an aggregate signature scheme [40,70] which allows n different signers
to sign n original messages with a single compressed signature. Considering that
each service in SARA has a unique servID, SARA can use a combination of an
ID-based cryptography [95] with an aggregate signature scheme, such as identity-
based aggregate signature scheme presented in [98]. The basic idea of this approach
is that some of the IoT devices, flagged as cluster-heads, will produce the aggregate
signature and send it to the Verifier along with the messages for the attestation
results generated by the other IoT devices.
Key management. For simplicity we assumed that SARA uses public/private
key pair for every device in the network. SARA could also employ the naive symmetric
key sharing approach among devices which reduces the operational cost in terms of
memory and computation with respect to the use of public/private key structure.
However, this approach does not provide a secure communication among services
since an attacker that manages to extract one key will be able to encrypt/decrypt all
the exchanged messages over the network. One potential alternative could be to use
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) [38,39]. ABE allows the data publishers to specify
the access policy by defining the attributes of the entities that are allowed to access
the data. In the publish/subscribe paradigm, this authentication mechanism can
ensure only the subscribers that match with the predefined attributes can decrypt
the received data.
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4.10 Conclusions and Open issues
This chapter presents SARA, an efficient and effective remote attestation protocol
that performs attestation over a potentially large number of resource-constrained IoT
devices. The main achievement of SARA is to overcome the shortcomings of other
attestation schemes by performing attestation of asynchronous communication in IoT
systems. We demonstrated SARA’s performance through realistic simulation over the
Contiki platform in terms of runtime and energy consumption of the devices. While
SARA addresses the issue of interruption time that remote attestation introduces to
a group of IoT devices, the problem of reducing the interruption time that remote
attestation introduces on an IoT device still remains an issue.
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Remote attestation as a Service
In this chapter, we use cloud/fog computing to attest an IoT device in an efficient
way. We propose Remote Attestation as a Service (RAaS) which allows IoT devices
to securely offload the attestation process to the cloud. We argue that RAaS could
reduce the number of attestation operations running on the real IoT device, saving
energy consumption, and reducing the downtime of the regular operation of an IoT
device during the execution of remote attestation.
5.1 Motivation
The deployment models of the Internet of Things (IoT) systems consist of a large
number of low-end devices supported by cloud platforms. The interactions between
an IoT device and cloud are usually facilitated by some devices in the network
that have more computational power, e.g., a base station, a smartphone, a fog
node. The distribution of the computational power closer to the low-end devices
seems a promising deployment model to enable the rapid deployment of large-scale
IoT applications that require real-time decision making and low latency [22]. At
the same time, the rapid deployment and tremendous growth of the IoT devices
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have increasingly exposed IoT systems to numerous types of attacks. Incidents like
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) [77], Stuxnet [3], Jeep-hack [92] have shown
that cyber attacks can cause serious consequences in IoT systems.
While IoT devices are usually deployed in distant environments, remote attesta-
tion has emerged as a convenient malware detection technique that aims to check
remotely the integrity of the software running on these remote untrusted IoT devices.
In a typical remote attestation protocol, one trusted party called Verifier (Vrf) initi-
ates the remote attestation by sending a challenge to a potentially untrusted device
called Prover (Prv). Upon the attestation request, the Prv stops the usual operation
to perform the attestation immediately. The complexity of the state-of-the-art remote
attestation protocols consumes energy and may cause a long suspension of the usual
work of the device while performing attestation. Thus, from the Prover’s perspective,
remote attestation is an overhead operation that consumes computational power
and battery life. These drawbacks can cause intolerable disruptions especially in
time-critical infrastructures such as medical facilities, nuclear plants, etc.
Motivation. Cloud computing has played a key role in broadening IoT appli-
cations through data offload, offline data analysis, service management, framework
integration, just to name a few. Data collected from IoT devices are currently stored
and processed in cloud systems, either directly or through an intermediary device.
However, the application of remote attestation in cloud is currently overlooked. To
optimize the attestation protocol for IoT devices, instead of improving the attestation
protocols deployed on an IoT device, we focus on utilizing the resources offered
by the cloud systems. We propose a cloud service (RAaS) that is able to securely
perform the remote attestation on behalf of an IoT device. RAaS will be able to get
the content of the memory from a low-end IoT device and then run independently
the attestation protocol on the cloud.
The basic idea is to enhance the existing ability of low-end devices to upload
data on cloud by enabling the device to upload also the content of its memory blocks.
This is not a trivial task. While sending the content in cloud, an adversary may
destroy or relocate itself on the other memory blocks to avoid uploading on the
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cloud service, and consequently remain undetected by the attestation protocol.
5.1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we outline a possible approach for designing RAaS. By offloading the
attestation to cloud, the remote attestation procedure will reduce the computations
of the low-end devices, will not impede a device for a long time to perform usual
work, and will consequently save their battery lifetime. The contribution of this work
is three-fold.
• We introduce a novel idea of the Remote Attestation as Service (RAaS) for
low-end IoT devices.
• We describe a possible approach for designing RAaS. RAaS could be a promising
solution for IoT networks which work in intermittent connectivity by performing
attestation on the cloud and help low-end IoT devices to save precious energy.
• We present the adversary model of RAaS and provide security analysis w.r.t.
adversarial assumptions.
5.1.2 Chapter outline
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we present the
motivation and contribution of this work. Next, we provide a brief background in
Section 5.2. We describe the system model in Section 5.3 and the adversary model in
Section 5.4. We provide the protocol description in Section 5.5 and security analysis
in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7 we identify the limitations of the approach, and this
chapter concludes in Section 5.8 with conclusions and future works directions.
5.2 Background
In this section, we present a brief background on the deployment models of IoT in
cloud and fog computing.
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5.2.1 Cloud architecture for IoT
Cloud computing technology offers the potential to use on-demand and scalable
resources both in terms of storage and processing services. Cloud computing is the
on-demand delivery of compute power, database storage, applications, and other
IT resources through a cloud services platform via the internet with pay-as-you-go
pricing [27]. Cloud services are particularly beneficial for IoT systems due to the
requirements for scalable management of a large number of interconnected IoT
devices and the requirements for real-time analysis of the vast quantities of data
associated with IoT systems.
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Figure 5.1. Serverless architecture in Cloud
Currently, various cloud platforms (such as Cloud IoT Core [19], AWS IoT [12],
IBM Watson IoT [25]) facilitate the connectivity of IoT devices to the cloud and
other devices. In addition, the major cloud providers have recently launched their
serverless computing platforms such as Google Cloud Functions [18], Microsoft
Azure Functions [15], Amazon Lambda [14], IBM Cloud Functions [20]. Serverless
computing in a new software development paradigm which decomposes monolithic
cloud-native applications into a set of functions. With Serverless computing, the
setup, capacity planning, and server management are invisible to the developer
because these tasks are handled by the cloud provider [26]. Overall, the goal of
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Serverless computing is to handle the execution management of functions, completely
separating it from data management. Each function can be launched through an API
call and instantiated in an isolated virtual environment, e.g., Docker container [16]. In
this way, the presence of serverless computing platforms allows the cloud providers to
offer compute runtimes, also known as Function-as-a-Service (FaaS), which execute
application logic but do not store data. While cloud follows "only paying for what you
use", the serverless computing can be described as pay-as-you-go computing as the
customers are charged only based upon the time and memory allocated to run your
code, without paying for idle time. The integration ofserverless computing platforms
with cloud IoT platforms, simplifies the management of IoT devices, enabling the
IoT devices to trigger event-driven execution of functions (as shown in Figure 5.1).
5.2.2 Distributing Cloud in Fog
The requirements of fast response time and low bandwidth usage bring a fundamental
necessity to move the data processing from cloud to edge devices. This shift of the
computations closer to the data producers is the foundation of the so-called Fog
Computing paradigm [22]. In fog computing, facilities or infrastructures that can
provide resources for services at the edge of the network are called fog nodes [106].
Many major cloud providers have adopted the fog computing paradigm in various
frameworks such as Azure IoT Edge [15], AWS Greengrass [13], EdgeX [17] etc.
These edge-oriented frameworks implement the function-based programming model,
triggering edge functions based on a topic-based publish/subscribe system (as shown
in Figure 5.2). The IoT edge computing frameworks can be programmed to filter
device data and send back to the cloud only necessary information.
5.3 System model
The aim of RAaS is to check the integrity of an untrusted device by performing the
attestation computation on the cloud. In our system, we consider three main entities
as shown in Figure 5.3.
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• Prover (Prv): it is a low-end IoT device (i.e., sensors and actuators). This is a
potentially untrusted device that will perform attestation.
• Remote attestation as a service (RAaS): it is a cloud-service, clone of the Prv,
that will perform the attestation on behalf of the Prv and sends attestation
result to the Vrf upon completion of the attestation.
• Verifier (Vrf): it is an external trusted entity that knows in advance the
legitimate state of the Prv. The purpose of the Vrf is to initiate the attestation
process and verify the trustworthiness of the Prv.
At the attestation time, Vrf will send a challenge to RAaS to initiate the
attestation ( 1 in Figure 5.3). When RAaS gets the challenge, RAaS will requests
the memory data of the Prv ( 2 ). Next, the Prv will read the memory ( 3 ) and
will send the content of the memory to RAaS ( 4 ). Once the memory is delivered
to RAaS, Prv will continue the usual work, while RAaS will perform the necessary
computation to run the attestation ( 5 ). At the end, RAaS will send the attestation
response to the Vrf ( 6 ), which can afterwards check whether Prv is compromised
or trustworthy.
Although the cloud model can introduce communication delays between a low-end
device and the cloud, our model can also be used on a low-end intermediate device.
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Figure 5.3. System model of remote attestation as a cloud service.
For example, the RAaS can be offered by a fog node in a fog computing paradigm
that can provide services at a low latency. In addition, this model can also be
extended in edge computing, where the edge device performs some of the calculations
and deliver the rest of the attestation protocol in cloud. Certainly, fog computing and
edge computing approaches require additional assumptions concerning the trusted
execution environments that should be present on each intermediary. To preserve
the generality of our approach and to avoid architectural assumptions that do not
necessarily affect our vision, we regard the RAaS as a cloud service, and we assume
the cloud platform is trusted.
In addition, we assume that Vrf is an external entity (e.g., person or device) that
periodically monitors the reliability of IoT devices. Alternatively, the cloud service
itself can also function as a Vrf. This approach could be particularly useful in the
Fog computing model, where fog nodes act as Vrf of the IoT devices with which
they communicate. Since the operations of the Vrf do not influence the internal
operations of RAaS, to preserve the generality of the system model, we consider the
Vrf as an external trusted party.
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5.4 Adversary Model
The goal of the RAaS is to detect a software-only attacker that infects either remotely
or being present physically near to the device. The adversary will try to be passive
during attestation in order to evade detection. In particular we assume:
• Software-adversary (Advsw). The Advsw exploits a software vulnerability to
compromise the device by injecting and executing an unauthorized malicious
code. In addition, a Advsw can also mount replay attack or man-in-the middle
attack by sending fake or “old" challenges.
• Mobile-adversary (Advmob). The attacker runs malware on the device and
during attestation will try to relocate itself in order to evade detection.
In line with other remote attestation techniques in literature, we exclude hardware
attacks (i.e., physical adversary) and network-wide Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks from the current scope of this work. For simplicity, we assume that
the cloud-based service is secure and can not be compromised. However, we describe
possible approaches that address software attacks in cloud platforms.
5.5 Remote attestation as a Service: RAaS
The main objective of our protocol is to make remote attestation lightweight for
low-end IoT devices. Therefore, we introduce RAaS as a mechanism that is able
to perform attestation on behalf of the Prv and consequently reduces the overhead
that remote attestation introduces in the device.
5.5.1 Protocol Overview
In Figure 5.4, we present a general overview of the algorithm performed by RAaS.
The Vrf initiates the attestation by sending a challenge Ch to the RAaS (Step 1
in Figure 5.4). Upon receiving the challenge, RAaS will verify the request vrfsig()
and then will request a copy of the memory blocks from the Prv (Step 2 ). The
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Prv will read the memory blocks (Step 3 ) and send it to RAaS (Step 4 ). We
describe the secure memory offload mechanism in Section 5.5.3. Once the RAaS gets
the memory blocks, it will perform attestation on the memory content (Step 5 )
and send the result along with the challenge to the Vrf (Step 6 ). The challenge
serves two purposes: first, it initiates the attestation process; second, it proves the
freshness of the attestation computation.
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Figure 5.4. The algorithm of RAaS attestation protocol
The RAaS will perform authentication1 of the Prv before copying the memory
content. The authentication can be achieved through secure key-mechanism which
can be chosen based on network and application requirements.
5.5.2 RAaS Working mechanism
In the following, we describe the main steps of the operations of RAaS (i.e., cloud
service) and the Verifier (Vrf).
RAaS operations
The RAaS performs the following main operations:
1Authentication can prevent proxy attacks.
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• Receive Attestation request: The cloud service (RAaS) receives challenge from
the Vrf to initiate the attestation process.
• Verify request: RAaS verifies the attestation initiation challenge to prevent
replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
• Memory block request: RAaS sends a request to a Prv to retrieve the content
of the memory blocks.
• Perform attestation: Upon receiving the entire memory blocks, RAaS performs
attestation.
• Report to Vrf: Upon completion of attestation, RAaS sends the attestation
report to the Vrf.
Algorithm 1: RAaS operations
Step1: Receive attestation initiation request with a
challenge.
Step2: Verify the challenge.
Step3: Send request to the Prv for memory block
initiation.
Step4: Perform attestation over received memory blocks.
Step5: send attestation result to the Vrf
Receive 
attestation 
request
Verify 
request
Send memory 
block request to 
the device
Start
Perform 
attestation
Send report 
to the Vrf
Figure 5.5. FSM-s of RAaS (cloud service)
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Figure 5.5 presents the aforementioned operations of RAaS in the finite state
machine (FSM) model.
Verifier operations
The Vrf has four main functions as follows:
• Attestation initiation: Vrf initiates the attestation process.
• Send challenge to RAaS: To counter replay attacks, Vrf sends challenge to the
RAaS.
• Attestation report gathering: Upon completion of attestation operation over
Prv ’s memory blocks, Vrf receives the attestation result from RAaS.
• Verify: Vrf compares the received attestation report with the expected legiti-
mate one.
Algorithm 2: Verifier operations
Step1: Initiate attestation request.
Step2: Send attestation request to the RAaS.
Step3: Collect attestation report from RAaS.
Step4: Verify the received attestation report.
The operations of the Vrf are shown in Figure 5.6 in the finite state machine
(FSM) model.
5.5.3 RAaS components
Data transmission vs Computational overhead
In evaluating the efficiency of the RAaS approach, one crucial consideration has to
do with the overhead of data transmission that the Prv has to send to the cloud
service. RAaS is an efficient approach in the scenarios when the overhead of data
transmission to the cloud is lower than the overhead of performing attestation locally
in the device. We argue that IoT devices are becoming multi-functional; for instance,
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Figure 5.6. FSM-s of Verifier
ST [24], Arduino [7], SensorTile [23] have simplified the development of multi-sensor
solutions. Considering that in some scenarios, not all the IoT services are active
all the time, a context-aware remote attestation procedure may need to attest only
the relevant services instead of attesting the entire IoT device. In this way, the
amount of data transmitted to the cloud service will be reduced to only a portion
of the Prv’s memory that has recently been changed. Moreover, we expect that
remote attestation performed by the cloud service increases the effectiveness of the
attestation. That is because, unlike resource-constraint IoT systems that perform
lightweight remote attestation, the cloud service will have unlimited resources to
conduct profound memory content analysis and identify prospective new threats.
Secure memory Offload
To securely copy Prv’s data-memory blocks, we rely on the usage of “memory-locking"
mechanism by operating system. Based on this mechanism, the entire memory of the
Prv will be locked at the beginning of the attestation process and individual memory
blocks will be released once the offload for that specific block is completed. Main
advantages of this approach are two-fold; firstly, Prv’s entire memory-content is not
locked for the whole attestation period and secondly, individual memory blocks upon
their release from RAaS can perform their usual work. Specifically, locked-memory
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blocks prevent other tasks from accessing these blocks during the attestation phase.
Thus, this mechanism prevents Advmob to evade detection by relocating itself in
different positions during the memory copy process from the Prv to the cloud service.
Additionally, since this technique does not lock the entire Prv’s memory for the
whole duration of the attestation process, the usual work of the Prv will not be
hindered for a long time.
Execution of cloud service
The cloud platform may pose serious security and privacy concern [42,90,104] for end
users. Although this work do not provide details how to cope with these concerns, a
possible solution can be “shielding applications" as discussed in [37]. In this approach,
an application can securely use hardware protection2 to execute applications in an
untrusted cloud environment.
5.6 Security Analysis
This section provides a discussion of the security analysis of RAaS w.r.t. the adversary
model introduced in Section 5.4.
• Software-adversary (Advsw). In RAaS, any malicious code present in the
IoT device will be reported to the clone of the IoT device in the cloud. The
communication data between the IoT device and the clone is authenticated
with a MAC symmetric encryption key kij . Given a secure MAC function,
it will be infeasible for Advsw to forge the data without knowing kij . This
guarantees that a identical copy of the memory of the IoT device will be
replicated in the cloud clone. Furthermore, the use of a randomized nonce R
preserves the freshness of the attestation result. Assuming that the probability
of sending a randomized nonce R, where R=Rold is negligible, two different
attestation results will not match. Therefore, a replay attack will be detected.
2In [37] authors employ Intel SGX as the hardware protection against privileged code and
physical attacks.
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• Mobile-adversary (Advmob). In RAaS, a secure memory lock mechanism
guarantees that the regions of the memory that are not copied yet to the
clone in the cloud will be locked for writing. Only after the content of a given
memory region has been replicated to the clone, the IoT device will gains full
permission in that memory region. In this way, a Advmob will not be able to
delete and relocate itself to different regions of the memory.
5.7 Limitations
In this work, our main aim is to obtain clear security guarantees and maximize the
efficiency of IoT devices by employing cloud-based services for performing remote
attestation on behalf of resource-constrained IoT devices. Mainly, we aim to propose
an efficient remote attestation scheme of IoT devices that is able to reduce the
suspension time of their regular work during the attestation. However, despite its
many advantages, RAaS has also limitations.
In particular, in line with other state-of-the-art remote attestation techniques [30,
36] we do not consider physical adversaries. A physical adversary can tamper with
the attestation process. A more comprehensive approach is missing in RAaS to
counter this threat.
Additionally, the use of the challenge helps to counter replay attacks, but the
same may not contribute to counter network-wide DDoS attacks. In real network
applications, DDoS attacks are a real threat. Thus we need a counter mechanism to
thwart any DDoS attack on RAaS.
Further, we have to improve three main areas for RAaS; (1) A secure communi-
cation process should be employed between the cloud service and the underlying IoT
devices, (2) the implementation of RAaS over a large heterogeneous IoT network (i.e.,
swarm), to validate its performance, and (3) energy-consumption, average packet
delivery ratio (APDR) data needs to be checked while performing attestation in
RAaS.
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5.8 Conclusions and Open issues
Providing security for low-end devices is a difficult task. Remote attestation protocols
intend to improve the security of these devices by detecting the adversarial presence.
However, remote attestation is significantly expensive in terms of computational
power and battery consumption. To address these challenges, we propose a cloud-
hosted remote attestation protocol that aims to offload the computation of the
attestation protocol. This work is a promising direction towards making remote
attestation applicable in real-time infrastructures. We believe that this research
direction opens up new perspectives in developing lightweight remote attestation
protocols for low-end devices that rely on the cloud.
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Conclusions and Future Works
Considering the wide deployment of IoT systems in safety-critical domains, the
security of the IoT devices plays a crucial role in protecting IoT data and operations.
To improve the security of IoT devices, many research works have proposed new
remote attestation techniques, which aim to detect the presence of malware in a
remote untrusted IoT device. At the attestation time, an IoT device typically has to
stop the regular operation and perform computations to attest a single or a group
of IoT devices.
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the limitations of the existing
remote attestation protocols, and propose novel remote attestation schemes that
increase efficiency and effectiveness of remote attestation protocols. In particular,
this thesis focuses on IoT services that are becoming more present on IoT devices
due to the recent IoT evolution which allows IoT devices to be multi-functional and
to be able to perform concurrent tasks.
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6.1 Thesis summary
This thesis brings three main contributions in the context of remote attestation
schemes for IoT systems (1) Synchronous remote attestation, (2) Asynchronous
remote attestation, and (3) Remote attestation as a service. In the following, we
summarize the results of this thesis.
6.1.1 Synchronous remote attestation
Chapter 3 presented Synchronous remote attestation. We first showed that a compro-
mised service in a distributed IoT service can induce malicious behaviour on genuine
services through the corrupted exchanged data. We then highlighted the need for the
attestation of distributed IoT services and presented RADIS, a remote attestation
protocol for synchronous distributed IoT services. Instead of attesting the complete
memory content of the entire interacting IoT devices, RADIS attests only the ser-
vices involved in performing a certain functionality. RADIS relies on a control-flow
attestation technique to detect IoT services that perform an unauthorized operation
due to their interactions with a malicious remote service.
6.1.2 Asynchronous remote attestation
Chapter 4 introduced SARA, a novel Secure Asynchronous Remote Attestation
protocol that considers the communication data exchanged among IoT services while
interactions among services occur in an asynchronous manner. This protocol provides
secure evidence regarding the order of the asynchronous interactions between different
services and the exchanged data between them. To the best of our knowledge, SARA
is the first asynchronous remote attestation protocol that executes asynchronously
the attestation of a group of devices, preventing the suspension of the regular
operation of all the devices at the same time. Additionally, SARA enables selective
attestation, by allowing the Verifier to establish both the trustworthiness and the
legitimate operations of a portion of the IoT system by interacting only with a subset
of the devices in the network.
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6.1.3 Remote attestation as a service
Chapter 5 proposed RAaS as a new remote attestation approach for low-end IoT
devices, which optimizes the attestation protocol for IoT devices by securely offloading
the attestation computation to the cloud. RAaS could be a promising approach
towards reducing the attestation overhead of the low-end IoT device, their energy
consumption, and the downtime of their regular operations during the attestation.
Moreover, IoT networks which work in intermittent connectivity can adopt RAaS
to perform attestation on the cloud and help low-end IoT devices to save precious
energy.
6.2 Future research directions
In this section, we discuss our prospective future works that follow this thesis.
• Mobile remote attestation.
Remote attestation schemes perform the network deployment and measurement
as an “offline" and static phase and do not consider any new node joining or
leaving the network during attestation. Thus, as a future work we are planning
to design a remote attestation technique that facilitates the attestation of
distributed IoT services in large mobile IoT networks, in which nodes join or
leave during the remote attestation procedure.
• Scalable remote attestation.
Remote attestation schemes consider the presence of a centralized trusted party
that initiates the attestation procedure and verifies the trustworthiness of an
IoT network. Future work includes the implementation of a distributed trust
mechanism to achieve scalable remote attestation for large IoT networks. One
possible solution could be the design of a lightweight multi-party computation
scheme, in which a group of devices collaboratively identify malicious services
in an IoT network, and in this way, self-attesting their IoT network without
the presence of a centralized trusted party.
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• Robust framework for IoT devices which operate in intermittent
connectivity.
Often IoT devices are deployed in the hostile region or assigned to perform
a critical task such as oil-gas exploration, nuclear plant monitoring. Due
to resource-constrained nature, these devices often stay in sleep-mode upon
completion of the assigned task to save energy. Thus maintaining the sanity
of the systems, even during intermittent connection, is an exigent task. We
are planning to extend and apply RAaS approach in designing robust security
mechanism for IoT devices that often stay in sleep mode, for which the on-
demand remote attestations is not always feasible.
• Enhancement of IoT Cloud frameworks.
Many major cloud providers are recently shifting their business model towards
Function-as-a-Service (FAaS) adopting serverless computing which allows
splitting monolithic cloud applications into a set of independent functions
or services. The execution of these services can be triggered by the events
generated from other systems, e.g., from IoT cloud frameworks which allow
IoT devices to interact easily among themselves and with cloud platforms.
Future work includes the implementation of the secure cloning of IoT devices in
major cloud IoT frameworks. This approach could be fundamental on providing
high-level security in IoT systems utilizing the cloud computing resources and
benefiting from the well-establishment deployment model of IoT application
on the cloud.
• Blockchain-based application for distributed security.
The exponential deployment of IoT devices in safety-critical domains require
continuous device monitoring to thwart any malicious activities. One interesting
approach could be employing blockchain-enabled decentralized approach where
devices can collaboratively perform network attestation and securely preserve
the historical evidence of device trustworthiness. Following this approach, a
network Verifier could validate the historical evidence at any given time to
have “knowledge" about the network state.
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• Integration of Remote attestation with other security mechanisms.
The service perspective that this thesis introduces in the field of remote
attestation opens up new research directions in designing remote attestation as
a building block for other security mechanisms applied in IoT systems such as
authentication, access control etc. Integrated with other security mechanisms,
remote attestation strengthens the security guarantees and helps in increasing
the reliability of the IoT systems.
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